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ABSTRACT
After having described the main features of investor-state
arbitration and the key challenges it is facing, this Article
investigates whether arbitral tribunals can be analogised to global
constitutional courts, or whether they are analogous to other
international tribunals. It then examines the promises and pitfalls
of constitutional theories of investor-state arbitration. This Article
argues that investor-state arbitration is not a form of global
constitutional adjudication, as arbitral tribunals are not akin to
constitutional courts, and for the time being maintain structural and
functional differences from the latter. In other words, arbitral
tribunals currently lack constitutional density. This does not
necessarily mean that they cannot acquire such density; they
certainly can, should states desire them to. Constitutional theory
can offer useful conceptual tools to reflect on investor-state
arbitration, and the dialogue between constitutional courts and
arbitral tribunals can be a fertile one. Nonetheless, this Article
highlights the importance of methodological pluralism and of an
inter-civilizational approach to address the current challenges
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investor-state arbitration is facing. Under international law,
countries are delimited by borders and remain the subjects of this
field of law. Nonetheless, this Article proposes the use of a broader
notion, that of civilization, to indicate a community of language,
culture, and worldview. Some countries are multicultural in that
their history has involved the encounter of different cultures and
civilizations. Adopting an inter-civilizational or inter-cultural
approach entails acknowledging the cultural (and constitutional)
diversity of countries and applying international law in a manner
that is sensitive to the cultural differences and constitutional
preferences of given countries. Adopting such an approach entails
a historical, anthropological, and principally legal understanding
that different cultures may prioritize different values and that
international law is a composite system that can applied in a manner
that is respectful of cultural differences. Recent developments seem
to suggest that, at least in some regional contexts, there are ongoing
attempts to fine-tune investment treaties to the needs of different
cultures and humanise the settlement of investment disputes.
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INTRODUCTION

Investor-state arbitration has moved “from a matter of
peripheral academic interest to a matter of vital international
concern.”1 Since the 1980s, investor-state arbitration has become a
standard feature in international investment treaties for the
settlement of disputes that arise between a foreign investor and a
host state.2 Under this mechanism, foreign investors may bring
claims against the host state before international arbitral tribunals,
typically without exhausting local remedies. This differs from the
traditional paradigm representing states as the only subjects of
international law and, as such, the only actors able to raise
international claims against other states in legal proceedings.3 The
internationalization of investment disputes is seen as an important
valve for guaranteeing a neutral forum and depoliticising
investment disputes.4
The increasing number of investment disputes—as well as the
high-profile status of several cases—has caused investor-state
arbitration to attract the sustained interest of policymakers, scholars,
and the public at large. The number of investment treaty
arbitrations continues to rise, reaching an estimated 1,000 cases by
the end of 2019.5 Investor-state arbitration is a truly global
phenomenon: investors from over seventy countries have sued 124
different states via investor-state arbitration between 1990 and
1
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 435 (2009).
2
David R. Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration:
Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 147, 148 (2004).
3
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44-45 (2009).
4
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:
The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 12 (1986). But see
M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 81-83 (2015) (discussing whether the neutrality of the arbitration
system is a carefully cultivated myth). For an examination of the limits and
potential of depoliticization in global governance, see ANTI-POLITICS,
DEPOLITICIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE ch. 1 (Paul Fawcett, Matthew Flinders, Colin
Hay & Matthew Wood eds., 2017).
5
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019:
Special
Economic
Zones,
102,
U.N.
Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2019,
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Q6H-J4GV].
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2014.6 Arbitral tribunals have reviewed state conduct in key sectors
including, but not limited to: water services, cultural heritage,
environmental protection, and public health.7 Consequently, many
recent arbitral awards have determined the boundary between two
conflicting values: the legitimate need for state regulation in the
pursuit of the public interest on the one hand, and the protection of
private interests from state interference on the other. With awards
that have reached as high as $50 billion USD,8 the field has attracted
increased attention from states, investors, and the media, as well as
the public at large.
Despite its growing prominence, investment treaty law and
arbitration are facing a “legitimacy crisis.”9 Concerns have arisen
regarding the magnitude of decision-making power allocated to
investment treaty tribunals.10 Some scholars contend that investorstate arbitration lacks democratic input.11 Others lament that
investor-state arbitration operates as a self-contained regime,
privileging the interests of foreign investors, while demonstrating a
“structural disregard” for those of “less powerful groups and of
vulnerable individuals.”12 There is uncertainty over the relevance of
norms external to investment law, such as human rights law, within

6
Rachel L. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 7 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 117, 126 (2016); Cédric Dupont & Thomas Schultz, Towards
a New Heuristic Model: Investment Arbitration as a Political System, 7 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 3, 22 (2016).
7
See, e.g., ANA MARIA DAZA-CLARK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: AN APPRAISAL OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION (2017);
VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION (2014); JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2013).
8
See, e.g., Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA
Case No. AA 227, Final Award, ¶ 1827 (July 18, 2014).
9
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521 (2005).
10 See The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality
(Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010).
11
Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008).
12
Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance:
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 211 (2014).
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investment treaty arbitration.13 The debate has focused not so much
on the question of whether arbitral tribunals review the exercise of
state sovereignty—at the end of the day, that is what international
tribunals do—but over the extent to which they exercise such
review, thus potentially constraining states’ ability to regulate.14
The conclusion of a treaty is not “an abandonment of sovereignty”;15
therefore, legitimate concerns may arise if the review of state
conduct by arbitral tribunals is perceived as going too far. An
additional concern relates to the possibility that international
investment law and arbitration can even prevent regulation in key
areas (the so-called “regulatory chill”).16 Moreover, developing
countries have deemed investment treaty arbitration to be politically
biased against them.17 In parallel, emerging economies and
industrialised countries alike have also expressed concerns about
this mechanism, albeit for different reasons.18
In response to the growing debate over investor-state
arbitration, states have increasingly felt the need to protect their
regulatory space and to limit arbitral discretion. While a few
developing countries have withdrawn from the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) system,19 other
13
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); see also INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ITS
OTHERS (Rainer Hoffmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2012) (discussing the interplay
between international investment law and other fields of law).
14
Edward Guntrip, Self-Determination and Foreign Direct Investment:
Reimagining Sovereignty in International Investment Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 829,
830 (2016).
15 Case of the SS “Wimbledon” (U.K. v. Ger.), Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. Rep. (Ser.
A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (“The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty
by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act
an abandonment of its sovereignty . . . . But the right of entering into international
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.”).
16
Gus Van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and the
Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, 7 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 92, 92 (2016).
17
Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias
under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 420 (2000).
18
Kate Miles, Investor–State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence and Future
Directions, 7 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 292 (2016).
19
See Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and
Does
Not
Achieve,
INV.
TREATY
NEWS
(Apr.
13,
2012),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-
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countries have moved away from the Energy Charter Treaty,20
terminated existing international investment agreements (“IIAs”),21
or omitted investor-state arbitration from their treaties. For
example, Brazil has never ratified the ICSID Convention, nor has it
ratified any treaty that provides for investor-state arbitration.22
Rather, its investment facilitation agreements feature an investment
ombudsman, mediation, and state-state remedies as an alternative
to investment treaty arbitration.23 Finally, several states are revising
their model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) to reduce the level
of investor protection provided by the treaty and expand the scope
of exception clauses.24 South Africa even “announced that it w[ould]
not conclude any more investment treaties.”25 States have also
shown growing reluctance to comply with orders and awards of
investment tribunals.26
The ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy of the
international investment regime highlights the need for some
rethinking or reform of the system. Such debate has both
evolutionary and revolutionary potential.27 On the one hand,
it-does-and-does-not-achieve/ [https://perma.cc/9HYM-RZYA] (noting that
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention).
20
Tania Voon & Andrew D. Mitchell, Denunciation, Termination and
Survival: The Interplay of Treaty Law and International Investment Law, 31 ICSID
REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 413, 416 (2016).
21
Id. at 414.
22
Jean Kalicki & Suzana Medeiros, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Revisiting
Brazil’s Traditional Reluctance Towards ICSID, BITs and Investor-State Arbitration, 24
ARB. INT’L 423, 424 (2008).
23
Geraldo Vidigal & Beatriz Stevens, Brazil’s New Model of Dispute Settlement
for Investment: Return to the Past or Alternative for the Future?, 19 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 475, 488-512 (2018).
24
See, e.g., NETHERLANDS DRAFT MODEL BIT, https://iaa-network.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Netherlands-Model-BIT-Draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QP98-3VJA]; MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/
Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pd
f [https://perma.cc/CV5Z-55BJ].
25
SORNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 5 n.17.
26
Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy:
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 57, 64 (2011).
27
Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 369
(2015).
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evolutionary approaches assume that the international investment
regime is experiencing growth pains, but many legitimacy concerns
“can be resolved over time.”28 Evolutionary approaches do not
accept all of the criticisms, but attempt to distinguish the positive
elements of the system from those that may have proven to be
problematic in practice.29 They envisage a recalibration of the
system through treaty drafting and treaty interpretation.30
On the other hand, revolutionary approaches criticize the overall
structure of the international investment regime as being deeply
flawed and call for major reforms.31 Proposed major reforms include
introducing an appeals body to review arbitral awards or creating a
permanent World Investment Court.32 While the European Union
(“EU”) has endorsed some of these proposals, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) has
provided a platform for negotiation.33 Some proposals even call for
eliminating investor-state arbitration,34 returning to diplomatic
Id.
See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 698 (2014).
30
See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill & Vladislav Djanic, Wherefore Art Thou? Towards
a Public Interest-Based Justification of International Investment Law, 33 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L. J. 29 (2018) (suggesting, inter alia, treaty reform to bring international
investment law better in line with human rights).
31
Behn, supra note 27.
32
Schill, supra note 26, at 68.
33
See U.N. Comm. on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Possible Reform
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149
(Sept.
5,
2018),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/WGIII-36thsession/149_main_paper_7_September_DRAFT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5H6LJV3]; Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL
Working Group III, Establishing a Standing Mechanism for the Settlement of
International
Investment
Disputes
(Jan.
18,
2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RU5U-PCSC]; GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & MICHELE
POTESTÀ, CIDS - GENEVA CTR. FOR INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, THE COMPOSITION OF A
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT AND OF AN APPEAL MECHANISM FOR INVESTMENT
AWARDS
(2017),
https://lk-k.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/CIDS_Supplemental_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8XV-UB9C].
34
See Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection
as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, May
25, 2015, at 1.
28
29
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protection,35 state-to-state dispute resolution, and/or domestic
dispute resolution.36 In Achmea, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (“CJEU”) invalidated the arbitration clause in a BIT between
EU members as incompatible with EU law, leaving only domestic
dispute resolution mechanisms for settling intra-EU investment
disputes. Therefore, the CJEU seems to prefer the domestic dispute
resolution of intra-EU investment disputes.37 Although the ruling is
not binding on arbitral tribunals—under international law, the
ruling of an international tribunal is not binding on other
international tribunals established under different treaties—it is
binding on EU Member States.38 Therefore, it is “likely to have farreaching consequences for investor-state disputes under the . . .
intra-EU BITs currently in force.”39
To address the legitimacy crisis of investment treaty arbitration,
several scholars have investigated the roles that constitutional
theory can play in investment arbitration and have advocated for its
use to address the challenges the field is facing.40 Arbitral tribunals
35
M. Sornarajah, Starting Anew in International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI
PERSP.,
July
16,
2012,
at
1,
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8057Q6S
[https://perma.cc/8XS6-DT9K].
36
See Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract
in International Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 125
(2008).
37
Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158,
Judgment (Mar. 6, 2018) (holding that the arbitration clause contained in the
Netherlands–Slovakia BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is
therefore incompatible with EU law).
38 Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany (II), ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea Issue (Aug. 31, 2018).
39
Clément Fouchard & Marc Krestin, The Judgment of the CJEU in Slovak
Republic v. Achmea – A Loud Clap of Thunder on the Intra-EU BIT Sky!, KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
(Mar.
7,
2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/07/the-judgment-of-thecjeu-in-slovak-republic-v-achmea/ [https://perma.cc/2AAM-2AWT].
40
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Brian McGarry, What Roles Can
Constitutional Law Play in Investment Arbitration?, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 862
(2014) (examining the role played by constitutional law in investment arbitration);
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan W. Schill
ed., 2010) (adopting an international public law approach); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International
Investment Law and Arbitration, 16 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 513 (2009); Peter-Tobias
Stoll & Till Patrick Holterhus, The ‘Generalization’ of International Investment Law in
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interpret, develop, and shape international investment law.
Although they are not lawmakers in theory, they play an important
role in the development of international investment law in
practice.41 Because the investment regime “is largely concerned
with the treatment of investors, and hence the relationship between
individual actors and the state,” investor-state arbitration has been
analogised to constitutional adjudication.42
The thrust of
constitutional adjudication is to protect individual entitlements and
liberties, and lead governments to comply with the constitution. As
is known, demand for constitutional adjudication arose mainly after
the end of WWII in order to subordinate politics to the rule of law
and to prevent totalitarianism. Within international investment
arbitration, constitutional law thinking can empower foreign
companies and individuals against abusive state behavior. This
Article investigates the question of whether international
investment tribunals play the role of global constitutional courts, or
whether they are analogous to other international tribunals such as
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). It also scrutinizes the
promises and pitfalls of the application of constitutional theory to
investor-state arbitration.
It then considers methodological
pluralism and inter-civilizational approaches as suitable
complementary tools of investigation.
The argument presented in this Article is three-fold. First is the
contention that arbitral tribunals cannot be considered global
constitutional courts for the time being. They lack certain key
structural and functional features that would render them akin to
global constitutional courts. Second, this does not mean that
constitutional theory is irrelevant to investor-state arbitration or
international law adjudication more generally. On the contrary,
there may be successful examples of cross-pollination of concepts
from the domestic to the international sphere and vice versa. The
Constitutional Perspective, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: MORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED 339, 344 (Steffen
Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016) (arguing that a “constitutionalist
perspective, with all caution, is . . . a viable tool for analysis of international
investment law”).
41
DOLORES BENTOLILA, ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS (2017).
42
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Submission from the European Union, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145 (Dec.
12, 2017).
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argument is that the dialogue and interaction between investor-state
arbitration and constitutional courts can be a fertile one. Moreover,
the fact that arbitral tribunals are not akin to global constitutional
courts does not mean that they may not acquire constitutional
density—that is, a different quasi-constitutional structure, mission,
and mandate in the future, provided that the international
community confer them such power. Third, it is suggested that
methodological pluralism and inter-civilizational approaches can
offer promising research paths to investigate investor-state
arbitration. Recent developments seem to suggest that, at least in
some regional contexts, there are ongoing attempts to fine-tune
investment treaties to the needs of different states and humanise the
settlement of investment disputes.
This Article proceeds as follows: after having described the
main features of investor-state arbitration and the key challenges it
is facing, this Article investigates whether arbitral tribunals can be
analogised to global constitutional courts. It then examines the
promises and pitfalls of constitutional theories of investor-state
arbitration. This Article argues that investor-state arbitration is not
a form of global constitutional adjudication as arbitral tribunals are
not akin to constitutional courts, and for the time being maintain
structural and functional differences from the latter. Arbitral
tribunals currently lack constitutional density. This does not
necessarily mean that they cannot acquire such density; they
certainly can, should states desire them to. Constitutional theory
can offer useful conceptual tools to reflect on investor-state
arbitration and the dialogue between constitutional courts and
arbitral tribunals can be a fertile one. Nonetheless, this Article
highlights the importance of methodological pluralism and of an
inter-civilizational approach to address the current challenges
investor-state arbitration is facing.
II.

ARE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS?

This Part briefly examines the nature of constitutional
adjudication and the global constitutionalist project and addresses
the question of whether arbitral tribunals can be considered global
constitutional courts. Far from being a purely theoretical debate,
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this investigation can potentially affect the international investment
regime as a whole. In order to properly address the question as to
whether arbitral tribunals can be considered global constitutional
courts, the section briefly describes the notion of constitutional law
and adjudication as well as global constitutionalism. It then
discusses the promises and pitfalls of this theory. It then concludes
that despite their functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are not
global constitutional courts.
a. The Constitutionalist Project
Can international law be perceived as the constitution of the
international community? Can international investment law be
perceived as a part of the overall global constitution—a certain
diffuse constitution in which different regimes enforce distinct
constitutional norms and values embedded in international law—
by protecting foreign investors and their investments? Can
investor-state arbitration then be perceived as a type of
constitutional adjudication? In order to address these questions, this
Section briefly defines constitutional law and adjudication and
illuminates the principal tenets of global constitutionalism.
Constitutional law expresses the highest law of the land. It refers
to a body of national law setting up fundamental norms and
procedures of state governance and expressing the fundamental
political, social, and cultural choices of a given polity. Not only does
it govern the relationships between the judicial, legislative, and
executive powers, but it also regulates the relationship between the
state and the individual. In doing so, constitutional law delimits
public powers and protects private rights.43 The basic idea
underpinning constitutional law is that the constitution establishes
a higher or supreme law.44 Whether codified or uncodified,45

43
See SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM
ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY 4 (1999).
44
Günther Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Law, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 171 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo
Mattei eds., 2012).
45
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408
(2007).
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constitutional law is a higher law governing the exercise of public
powers.46
Constitutional courts play a vital role in enforcing constitutional
law, aiming to constitute a fundamental bulwark against grave
infringements of fundamental rights granted in the constitution, and
to enforce constitutional law vis-à-vis government.47 Constitutional
adjudication is a mechanism for resolving disputes in the field of
constitutional law, ensuring the rule of law, and has been
characterised as “the soul” of the constitution.48
While
constitutional courts were somewhat rare before the end of World
War II, they have now become a common feature of contemporary
Western democracies.
Global constitutionalism is a conceptual movement or doctrinal
project—some
contend
a
phenomenon—that
conceives
constitutional law as a field of knowledge that transcends the
dichotomy between the national and the international. Developed
in Germany, constitutionalist thought has spread to Europe and
other countries since the aftermath of WWII. Constitutionalists
conceptualize current developments in international law as
evidence of ongoing constitutionalisation or propose the
“constitutionalisation” of a number of different areas of
international law. They argue that the constitutionalisation of
different areas of law—ranging from public international law49 to

GORDON, supra note 43, at 4.
Doreen Lustig & J. H. H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—
Retrospective and Prospective, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 315 (2018).
48
CivA CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village,
49(4) PD 221 (1995) (Isr.).
49
JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (examining the questions as to whether and, if so, to
what extent the international legal system has constitutional features); Bardo
Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS 307 (Nickolaos K.
Tsagourias ed., 2007) (suggesting, inter alia, that the Charter of the United Nations
can be considered the constitution of the international community); TOWARDS
WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005)
(arguing that constitutional perspectives in international legal discourse contribute
to protecting human welfare).
46
47
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international economic law50 and EU law51—promotes their
humanisation, suggests the idea of a scale of higher values and thus
potentially contributes to the legitimacy of these systems.52
Constitutionalists transpose constitutional law themes onto the
international plane. They argue that constitutional law and
international law are analogous. They also note that treaty-based
organisations are more than just interstate agreements among
members; they are also institutions of global governance. According
to the constitutionalists, international law norms play the role that
constitutional principles play in the domestic sphere. International
institutions have the power to set norms that are either binding or
difficult to disregard for many states. In parallel, international
courts play the role that constitutional courts play within state
members. Accordingly, international law, institutions, and courts
should respect constitutional values. Constitutionalists aim to
“subject the exercise of all types of public power . . . to the discipline
of constitutional procedures and norms.”53 They also recommend
the use of classic tools of constitutional adjudication, such as
proportionality, in international adjudication.54
50
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Constitutional Perspectives on International Economic Law,
in REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
201, 212 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann et al. eds., 2014) (suggesting that “a
constitutionalist view is essential in the era of globalization where the growing
interdependence and the emergence of effective international regimes put into
question the sovereign powers of states”); see DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY,
DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (2005).
51
See J. H. H. WEILER, Fin-de-Siècle Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: ‘DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?’ AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 238 (1999) (elaborating the notion of
European constitutionalism as a process restraining the power of nation states and
promoting peaceful and prosperous relations); see also Christiaan Timmermans, The
Constitutionalization of the European Union, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 2 (2002) (considering the
development of the EU legal order as “a striking example of . . .
constitutionalization”);
THOMAS
CHRISTIANSEN
&
CHRISTINE
REH,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2009) (suggesting that “the [EU] has
been constitutionalized by way of informal incrementalism.”).
52
See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909 (2004) (suggesting that “the
legitimacy of international law ought to be assessed using a richer constitutionalist
framework.”).
53
Martin Loughlin, What Is Constitutionalisation?, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM? 47, 47 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
54 Id. at 62.
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For some constitutionalists, international investment law and
arbitration are undergoing the process of constitutionalisation. In
fact, because many investment treaties overlap or converge to a
significant extent, for some scholars, this convergence can also lead
to the constitutionalisation of the field. In parallel, although there is
no binding precedent in international law, the possible coalescence
of arbitral jurisprudence can prompt the emergence of a sort of
constitutional field, where the economic interests of investors are
balanced with the various interests of states.55
b. Challenges in Theory
This Section discusses three main critiques of global
constitutionalism that are based on its alleged failure to adequately
address: (1) the dynamic between identity and cultural diversity; (2)
legal pluralism; and (3) democratic concerns.
First, global
constitutionalists commonly rely on comparisons between the
constitutional laws and policies of Western democracies. Global
constitutionalism has focused “primarily on Europe and the United
States.”56 Critics fear that constitutionalism may impede the
development of a multi-civilization vision of international law, and
thus may be dangerous in normative terms because it may have “a
uni-civilizational, notably European, bias built into it.”57 For
instance, the development of judicial review has been contested in
Asia.58 Moreover, as civilizations have influenced each other and
55
See Peter Behrens, Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment
Protection, 45 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 153, 154 (2007).
56
See Vidya Kumar, Towards a Constitutionalism of the Wretched: Global
Constitutionalism, International Law and the Global South, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (July
27, 2017), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/towards-a-constitutionalism-of-thewretched [https://perma.cc/N3ZX-ZXS5 ].
57
Anne Peters, The Constitutionalization of International Law: Conclusions, EJIL:
TALK! (July 28, 2010), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constitutionalization-ofinternational-law-conclusions [https://perma.cc/P4SZ-PDPG].
58
See Wen-Chen Chang, Asian Exceptionalism? Reflections on “Judicial Review in
the Contemporary World”: Afterword to the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H.
Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 31, 39 (2019); Albert H.Y. Chen, The Achievement of
Constitutionalism in Asia: Moving Beyond ‘Constitutions without Constitutionalism,’ in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 16 (Albert H. Y.
Chen ed., 2014).
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have transformed themselves through these mutual influences, an
international (in the sense of inter-civilizational and intercultural)
perspective of international law, seems preferable.
Such a
perspective considers not only economic factors, but also addresses
political, social, cultural, religious, and historical factors as well.59
As a Western doctrine of German origins, constitutionalism may be
perceived as a tool to perpetuate the protection of Western,
individual values to the detriment of other more communitarian
values coming from different regions and from different
civilizations.60 The “grand narrative” of constitutionalism risks
obscuring awareness of the “diverse and rich” “empirical world”
and the cultural diversity of the international community expressing
different sensibilities, values, and worldviews.61
Very few
constitutionalist studies discuss the legal systems and experiences
of the Global South.62
Second, arbitral tribunals can serve as a bulwark against
corruption, arbitrariness, and bias, and can ultimately protect
foreign investments that have clear analogies with property rights.
Nonetheless, given the almost monothematic nature of investment
treaties, if an excessive emphasis is put on the protection of
property, this may quell other non-economic and communitarian
interests that may be legitimately pursued by the state in the exercise
59
See Onuma Yasuaki, An Intercivilizational Perspective on International Law, in
ALBERICO GENTILI: L’ORDINE INTERNAZIONALE IN UN MONDO A PIÙ CIVILTÀ: ATTI DEL
CONVEGNO DECIMA GIORNATA GENTILIANA 65 (Centro Internazionale di Studi
Gentiliani ed., 2004) [hereinafter Yasuaki 2004]; ONUMA YASUAKI, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL WORLD 19 (2017) [hereinafter YASUAKI 2017]
(describing this as a “perspective from which people see, sense, (re)cognize,
interpret, assess, and seek to propose solutions for the ideas, activities, phenomena
and problems transcending national boundaries by adopting a cognitive and
evaluative framework based on the recognition of the plurality of civilizations and
cultures that have long existed throughout human history”).
60
See Ming-Sung Kuo, Taming Governance with Legality? Critical Reflections
Upon Global Administrative Law as Small-C Global Constitutionalism, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 55, 101 (2011) (detailing the legitimacy of global governance); Julio RíosFigueroa, Judicial Review and Democratic Resilience: Afterword to the Foreword by
Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 17, 18-19 (2019) (detailing the
contrast of values imposed by international courts).
61
See Başak Çali, On Einsteinian Waves, International Law and National Hats:
Afterword to the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 24,
25 (2019).
62
But see CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS
OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013).
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of its state sovereignty, or even in compliance with other noneconomic international obligations. Because arbitrators must
interpret and apply IIAs, which thus far have not presented a
particularly comprehensive list of rights and obligations, critics
contend that the constitutionalist reading of international
investment law may be premature, as, at the moment, a truly
“constitutional” multilateral investment treaty is lacking. A
constitutional reading of international investment law may end up
favouring foreign investors without adequate consideration of the
communities that may be affected by a given investment, for
instance, in the form of environmental damage or cultural
destruction. In this regard, critics contend that such constitutionalist
reading of international law “may be genuinely anti-pluralist” by
promoting a strong emphasis on property rights vis-à-vis other noneconomic interests and values, and an idea of balance that may be
shared in some societies, but not necessarily in other polities.63
Critics also highlight the political nature of constitutionalism, noting
that it can potentially serve as a vehicle for dominant actors and the
entrenchment of current economic ideologies.64
Third, not only does the purported universalism of
constitutionalism betray an implicit cultural bias,65 but it may also
have “weak democratic credentials,”66 evidenced by trying to
enhance the effectiveness of given regimes without calling into
question their histories, structures, values, and objectives.67 From a
historical perspective, the goal of early IIAs was to protect the
economic interests of investors from industrialised countries while
fostering the economic development of the host state. This historical

63
See, e.g., Peters, supra note 57 (rebutting this criticism, arguing that “while
constitutionalist thought has in historic terms been developed in Europe, it is a
reaction to the . . . experience of domination by humans over other humans”).
64 See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF RULES 81 (2011) (noting popular criticism
of constitutionalists as having “hegemonic overtones of their agenda purportedly
dedicated to the promotion of global values.”).
65
Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values,
17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006).
66
Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 60, at 18.
67
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 15 (2009).
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background has shaped the terms of investment treaties.68 Only
recently, have some states recalibrated the texts of such treaties to
include reference to fundamental policy interests and values. Most
of these instruments include full protection and security, fair and
equitable treatment, compensation in case of expropriation, and
prohibition of performance requirements. Nonetheless, they remain
laconic about important policy interests. From a structural
perspective, Eyal Benvenisti has highlighted the democratic deficit
of global governance. If constitutionalism aims to establish a culture
of accountability of states, a culture of accountability of international
institutions and international courts and tribunals must be
developed, too.69 Moreover, by assuming that international law
possesses a degree of coherence which it does not, constitutionalism
risks overlooking the dynamic, evolving, and pragmatic nature of
international law. In this respect, it risks focusing on legal theory
while neglecting the practice of international law.
Whether constitutionalisation is desirable also remains an open
question. The interplay between international investment law and
constitutionalism is more ambiguous than it may seem at first
glance. As the function of constitutional law is generally to protect
individuals against the excessive, arbitrary, or unfair exercise of
public power, constitutional theory can perform a similar function
at the supranational level.70 Concerns have arisen that such a
perspective can reinforce the rights of investors at the expense of the
common good in investment treaty arbitration.71 For some, there is
a risk that IIAs “become a charter of rights for foreign investors, with
68
See Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present
Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 492 (2009).
69
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 287 (2014).
70
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B.
Wiener, Foreword, Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational
Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) (“Global
Administrative Law . . . ensur[es] these bodies meet adequate standards of
transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by
providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make.”).
71
See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through “Higher Law”?
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in 4 THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 307
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003) (providing examples such as a
“new binding, juridical rigorous dispute settlement mechanism, which provides for
virtually automatic authorization of countermeasures in the case of noncompliance”).
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no concomitant responsibilities or liabilities, no direct legal links to
promoting development objectives, and no protection for public
welfare in the face of environmentally or socially destabilising
foreign investment.”72 For instance, Schneiderman has questioned
whether foreign investors are “the privileged citizens of a new
constitutional order.”73 He cautions that, while the use of
constitutional principles in investment arbitration can symbolically
suggest that investment tribunals are similar to national high courts,
not only can IIAs jeopardise the inherent right of sovereign states to
regulate, but investment arbitration can risk invoking constitutional
principles for purposes that are at odds with their rationale.74
c. Challenges in Practice
After having examined the theoretical critiques of
constitutionalist approaches to investor-state arbitration, one may
wonder if similarities between constitutional adjudication and
investor-state arbitration nonetheless exist in practice. Can investorstate arbitration be then perceived as a type of constitutional
adjudication? At first glance, it seems obvious that investment
tribunals do not qualify as global constitutional courts—if only
because they are not courts and are not global because they are not
based on a multilateral instrument. Upon further reflection,
however, the possible existence of functional analogies between
arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts requires some
consideration. This Section is divided into three parts. Part i
critically assesses the structural differences between investor-state
arbitration and constitutional adjudication. Part ii scrutinizes the

72
See Howard Mann, The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment
Law: A Comment, in UNCTAD, THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND
RULE-MAKING PERSPECTIVES 211, 212, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 (2003).
73
See DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 5 (2008).
74
See David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? Political Process and
International Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909, 914 (2010) (noting that “[t]he
tribunal [European Court of Human Rights] invoked reasons that, as in in national
constitutional settings, tend to legitimate the power to negative governmental
decision making”).
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alleged functional analogies. Part iii concludes that arbitral
tribunals are not global constitutional courts.
i.

Structural Analogies?

This Section examines the structural differences between
investor-state adjudication and constitutional adjudication. From a
structural perspective, arbitral tribunals are not courts. They are
created on an ad hoc basis for resolving single disputes under
different arbitral rules.75 Such tribunals “do not pre-exist the dispute
submitted to them and disband once they have issued their
decision.”76 Arbitrators do not have permanent tenure. “[I]n the
current system[,] the parties to the dispute play a significant role in
the selection of the adjudicators.”77 The disputing parties’ right to
each appoint one of the arbitrators respectively is what distinguishes
arbitration from litigation, and it has been a “historical keystone” of
investment arbitration.78
Transparency and diversity are also additional structural
features that differentiate investor-state arbitration from
constitutional adjudication.
While disputes adjudicated by
constitutional courts generally attract public attention and
constitutional judgments are generally public, the transparency of
arbitral proceedings varies, depending on the choice of the parties
and the applicable arbitral rules. Only recently have efforts been
undertaken to make investor-state arbitration more transparent to
the public.79 Moreover, “diversity levels in international arbitration
[are] somewhat lower than in several national court systems.”80 For
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶¶ 6-7.
Id. ¶ 7.
77
Id. ¶ 5.
78
V. V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The PartyAppointed Arbitrator—From Miami to Geneva, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 127, 128 (David C. Caron et al. eds., 2015).
79
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 10, 2014).
80
Susan D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias Lehmann & Anne van
Aaken, The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International
Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 430-31 (2015) (noting that investment
treaty arbitration “experiences challenges related to gender, nationality, or age”).
75
76
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instance, according to a study, “research from 252 [investment treaty
arbitration] awards rendered by January 2012 identified a pool of
247 different arbitrators wherein 80.6% were from OECD states and
3.6% were women.”81 Given that “Asia has the largest population
in the world, and Africa has the second largest,” certainly the
composition of arbitral tribunals is not demographically
representative.82 Reportedly, “[w]hile women make up almost half
of the world’s population, they continue to be severely underrepresented on international courts and tribunals, including on
arbitral tribunals.”83 Finally, the percentage of arbitrators “from
indigenous or poor backgrounds, minority groups within their own
countries, or having disability status appears virtually unquestioned
and unknown.”84
Debate continues as to whether a representativeness
requirement should be applied to investment tribunals, appeal
panels, and the envisaged multilateral investment court.85 Three
Id. at 439.
Id. at 457-58 n.77. While Asia contains the largest population of all
continents (60.27%), Asian arbitrators were the second least represented (10%) of
ICCA arbitrators. Id. Similarly, although Africa holds the second largest
population of all continents (15.41%), Africa exhibited the lowest level of
representation (0.4%) Id. See also Becky L. Jacobs, A Perplexing Paradox: “DeStatification” of “Investor-State” Dispute Settlement?, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 17, 32
(2015) (“Using 2014 ICSID data as a sample, seventy percent of ICSID arbitrators
are from Western Europe and North America; a mere two percent are from SubSaharan Africa. Compare that with the claims data: one percent of ICSID cases
involved Western European states as host state defendants, yet more than sixteen
percent of all ICSID cases involved African State respondents.” (citations omitted));
see generally WON L. KIDANE, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2017)
(discussing the composition and culture of arbitral tribunals).
83
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶ 63. In 2015 “women
amounted to 20% on the ICJ, 5% for ITLOS (with only one female judge out of 21),
14% of the WTO AB (with only one female member out of 7) and 18% on the CJEU.”
Id. According to the same study, the ECtHR (33%) and the ICC (39%) score better.
Id.
84
Nienke Grossman, Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication,
56 VA. J. INT’L L. 339, 342 (2016).
85
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶ 34 (noting that appeal
panels and the multilateral investment court “should be comprised of competent
members, having the expertise and experience to discharge their functions; (ii) . . .
should reflect high standards of diversity, representative of those for whom these
bodies renders [sic] justice; and (iii) . . . should be endowed with strong guarantees
of independence . . . for the concrete exercise of each member’s adjudicatory
functions”).
81
82
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fundamental factors require diversity in international courts. First,
“geometries of exclusion” can affect the perception that arbitral
tribunals constitute legitimate, impartial, and representative dispute
settlement mechanisms.86 How can they be legitimate, impartial,
and representative by effectively excluding the voices of several
constitutive parts of the international community?87 Legitimacy
entails that “those affected should be represented among decisionmakers.”88 Additionally, diversity is key for the settlement of
international disputes in a diverse world.89 Second, far from being
a merely technical question, the composition of arbitral tribunals can
have “a direct impact on the quality of the decision-makers and,
hence, on the quality of international justice.”90 In fact, “behavioral
studies suggest that a group of people of different ethnicities, gender
and social backgrounds integrates diverse viewpoints in its
reasoning and decision-making, and thus produces better quality
decisions by reason of diversity alone.”91 Third, many states
demand that international adjudicative bodies reflect broad
geographical representation and several existing statutes of
international courts explicitly refer to “equitable geographical
representation” for the selection of adjudicators.92
Some
86
Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial
Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 525, 528 (2007).
87
See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 379, 392 (1999) (comparing feminist methods to other methodologies of
international law); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (focusing on selected historical aspects of
international law).
88
See Grossman supra note 84, at 345; Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke,
On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GER. L.J. 1341,
1343 (2011) (“study[ing] how judicial lawmaking can be linked to the values,
interests, and opinions of those whom it governs”); see also Gráinne de Búrca,
Developing Democracy beyond the State, 46 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226-27 (2008)
(arguing for “legitimate democracy-oriented governance processes beyond and
between states.”).
89
KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 33, ¶¶ 51-53.
90 Id. ¶ 2.
91
Id. ¶ 43.
92
See United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Working Grp. III (Inv.-State
Dispute Settlement Reform) Thirty-Eighth Session, Possible Reform of InvestorState Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Selection and Appointment of ISDS Tribunal
Members, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169 (Oct. 14-18, 2019); see, e.g., U.N.
Charter art. 9 (“At every election, the electors shall bear in mind . . . that in the body
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international law instruments require states to give due
consideration to adequate gender representation in nomination
processes of international judges. For instance, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) is a gender-balanced court, and the very
statute of the court demands gender balance.93 Analogously, several
regional instruments have undertaken significant steps towards
gender balance.94
Therefore, from a structural perspective, there are several
differences between arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts.
Constitutional judges generally hold tenure, and their appointment
follows detailed constitutional procedures. The composition of the
courts tends to consider some sort of geographical, ethnic, and
gender representation. Although assuming gender parity would
mean that fifty percent of the judges are women, few countries have

as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal
legal systems of the world should be assured.”); Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea art. 2, ¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 (“In the Tribunal as a
whole the representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable
geographical distribution shall be assured.”).
93
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36, ¶ 8(a),
Nov. 10, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges,
take into account the need, within the membership of the Court, for . . . [a] fair
representation of female and male judges.”).
94
See, e.g., Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 12, ¶ 2,
June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III) (“Due
consideration shall be given to adequate gender representation in the nomination
process.”). This Protocol was replaced by the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights on 1 July 2008; article 5(2) of the Annex of the
new Protocol reads: “Each State Party may present up to two (2) candidates and
shall take into account equitable gender representation in the nomination process.”
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 1,
Annex, art. 5 ¶ 2, July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 337. As of the date of publication, seven ut
of eleven judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are women.
Current Judges, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., https://www.africancourt.org/wpafc/current-judges/ [https://perma.cc/ANF7-5ZU8].
In the
European Continent, “the 2004 Resolution of the Council of Europe’s parliamentary
assembly . . . [required] gender balance on the list of candidates presented by states
for the post of judge at the Court.” Stéphanie Hennette Vauchez, More Women—
But Which Women? The Rule and the Politics of Gender Balance at the European Court of
Human Rights, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 195, 195 (2015).
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actually achieved such a percentage for their highest courts.95
Recent studies looking at women’s representation in Supreme
Courts across the world show that “71.8% of the average country’s
Supreme Court bench is made up of men and only 28.2% of judges
are women,”96 despite the fact that most states have “constitutional
or codified laws pertaining to diversity.”97
In conclusion, critics doubt the empirical reality of the
constitutionalisation of international adjudication in general, and
investor-state arbitration in particular, because “[c]onstraints such
as the principle of separation of powers, checks and balances, and
limits on the exercise of . . . power, which have long guaranteed
‘democratic participation and human rights within states,’ are nonexistent at the global level.”98 Legal theorists point out that “an a
priori, global . . . constitutional order . . . does not really exist[;] . . .
adjudication does not . . . obey the logics of a (metaphysical) global
system . . . , but should look instead to the potential justice[] . . . that
belongs to [the facts of the case].”99
International law in general, and international investment law in
particular, do not display centralized instruments and organs that
are truly comparable to domestic ones. As Stephan Schill aptly
pointed out, there are ongoing processes of de facto
multilateralization of the investment treaty regime, including a
convergence among different investment treaties and the gradual
development of a jurisprudence constante.100 However, for the time

95
See Beverley Baines, Women Judges on Constitutional Courts: Why Not Nine
Women?, in CONSTITUTIONS AND GENDER 290 (Helen Irving ed., 2017) (considering
the argument for nine women on the United States Supreme Court).
96
Oliver Martin, Justice Can Only Be Done When We Have Equal Representation
in
the
Judiciary,
KING’S
COLL.
LONDON
(Aug.
29,
2019),
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/justice-can-only-be-done-when-we-have-equalrepresentation-in-the-judiciary [https://perma.cc/T5NE-7QAH].
97
Jacobs, supra note 82, at 38.
98
ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO
DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING 69 (2016) (quoting BENVENISTI, supra note 69, at 17).
99
Gianluigi Palombella, Theory, Realities, and Promises of Inter-Legality: A
Manifesto, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTER-LEGALITY 363, 379 (Jan Klabbers & Gianluigi
Palombella eds., 2019).
100
See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra
note 40.
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being, there are more than 3,000 IIAs,101 and arbitral tribunals are
constituted only on an ad hoc basis.
ii.

Functional Analogies?

From a functional perspective, some scholars have viewed
international investment law as a part of the overall global
constitution by protecting foreign investors and their investments,
and they have analogised investor-state arbitration to public
law/constitutional law adjudication.102 “Like constitutions, [IIAs]
restrict [s]tate action.”103
Like constitutional courts, arbitral
tribunals settle disputes arising from the exercise of public power
and constrain the sovereignty of states by setting out limits to their
discretion.104 Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of
governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be
protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the state.105
Such scrutiny of the exercise of public authority displays
“constitutional features.”106 In addition, in settling investment
101 Investment
Policy
Hub,
UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements
[https://perma.cc/3AVP-LCCW] (reporting that, as of April 26, 2021, there are
2852 bilateral investment treaties and 417 treaties with investment provisions).
102
See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4
(Vaughan Lowe, ed., 2007) (comparing investor-state arbitration to public law
adjudication for the purpose of critique); SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009) (discussing the global impact of bilateral
investment treaties).
103
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 373 (2009).
104
See Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public
Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the
Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 401, 413 (2010) (identifying the strict “substantive
and procedural law applicable in investment treaty arbitrations”); Gus Van Harten
& Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (2006) (demonstrating how investment treaty
arbitration serves as a “regime as a means of reviewing and controlling the exercise
of public authority by the state”).
105
See M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on
Foreign Investment, CANADIAN FOREIGN POL’Y J., Mar. 14, 2011 at 1, 17.
106
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 93 (2012).
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disputes, arbitrators often borrow key constitutional law principles
that guide the conduct of public administrations—such as
reasonableness, procedural fairness, and efficiency—as useful
parameters for evaluating the conduct of states and assessing their
compliance with relevant investment treaties.107
Investment
arbitrations can (and have) touch(ed) upon key constitutional
interests, dealing with questions relating to the protection of cultural
heritage, public health, and other fundamental interests and
values.108
However, the substance of investor-state arbitration differs from
that of constitutional adjudication for multiple reasons. Investorstate arbitration is a creature of international law. Like other
international law instruments, IIAs limit state sovereignty.109 Like
other international courts and tribunals, investment tribunals
review state compliance with international law. Therefore, the
question as to whether this, in and of itself, renders any particular
field or institution of international law as “constitutional” remains
an open one. Arguably, the fact that IIAs constrain regulatory
autonomy cannot be determinative of the “constitutionalisation” of
arbitral tribunals.
Constitutions are comprehensive instruments that encapsulate
the fundamental political choices of a given community. They are
the outcome of decades (if not centuries) of historical, political, and
social struggles. They embody a pact among citizens and
necessarily include a balance among different interests.
Comparative constitutional studies show that states balance similar
interests in different ways, based on different cultures, traditions,
and customs. In contrast, most IIAs are short instruments, which
are sometimes negotiated by the executive power of given states,110
but they are more often unilaterally drafted and imposed by
107
See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 104, at 146 (exploring the standards
of investment tribunals).
108
See generally INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST
PERSPECTIVES (Freya Baetens ed., 2013) (discussing the interplay between
international investment law and international law).
109
See Guntrip, supra note 14, at 829-30.
110
Mila Versteeg, Understanding the Third Wave of Judicial Review: Afterword to
the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and J. H. H. Weiler, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 10, 14 (2019)
(“[A] growing number of countries [including the European Union and the United
States] require legislative approval of treaties prior to their ratification . . . thereby
boosting the treaties’ democratic credentials.”).
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powerful capital-exporting states as so-called “boilerplate
treaties.”111 IIAs often have concurring objectives, including those
of promoting peaceful and prosperous relations among nations,
protecting foreign investments, and promoting the (sustainable)
development of the host state. Yet, they do not provide the
adjudicator with a complete value system as do constitutions.
Rather, they provide a recurring range of clauses concerning such
topics as protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and
equitable treatment, and non-discrimination. They usually say little
about how to balance economic interests and non-economic values,
including fundamental human rights. In other words, they do not
provide a complete value system, at least for the time being.
International investment law remains a specialised regime of
international law. Only recently have some agreements included a
range of policy concerns at length, even including reference to
selected human rights, such as labour rights.112
While constitutional courts “paradigmatically govern and unite
all aspects of the common good . . . for all persons subject to their
authority,”113 arbitral tribunals have a more “monothematic”
jurisdiction, in that they focus mainly on settling disputes between
the foreign investor and the host state, “affording protection to
foreign investments” and promoting the (sustainable) development
of the host state.114 While constitutional courts have a broad
jurisdiction and “the formal or effective power to coordinate various
sectors into a single coherent fabric of law,”115 arbitral tribunals have
jurisdiction over investment-related disputes only.
While constitutional law is the product of a political context and
expresses the political choices of a given state, investor-state
arbitration aims to depoliticise disputes between foreign investors
111
See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL
WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 224-25 (2017).
112 See generally Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International
Agreements (2008), https://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C85L-ZXXQ].
113
Paolo G. Carozza, The Problematic Applicability of Subsidiarity to International
Law and Institutions, 61 AM. J. JURIS. 51, 59 (2016).
114
Federico Ortino, Investment Treaties, Sustainable Development and
Reasonableness Review: A Case Against Strict Proportionality Balancing, 30 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 71, 91 (2017).
115
Carozza, supra note 113, at 59.
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and host states.116 It constitutes a rule-based dispute-settlement
mechanism for resolving investment disputes that aims to shield
such disputes from power politics and insulate them from the
diplomatic relations between states.
In theory, the depoliticisation of investment disputes benefits
foreign investors, the host state, and the home state.117 First, foreign
investors no longer depend on diplomatic protection to defend their
interests against the host state.118 Rather, they can bring claims
directly against the host state and make strategic choices in the
conduct of the proceedings. In this regard, investor-state arbitration
can facilitate access to justice for foreign investors and provide a
forum for the settlement of investment disputes.119 Investor-state
arbitration can be necessary to render meaningful the substantive
investment treaty provisions.120 Second, the depoliticisation of
investment disputes can protect the host state by reducing the
interference of the home country in the domestic affairs of the host
state.121 It can prevent or “limit unwelcome diplomatic, economic
and perhaps military pressure from strong States whose nationals
believe they have been injured.”122 Third, the depoliticisation of
investment disputes can also protect the home state in that it no
longer “ha[s]to become embroiled in investor-state disputes.”123
In practice, whether arbitral tribunals have accomplished such
depoliticisation or whether they have remained subject to some level
of power politics remains open to debate. Nonetheless, unlike
constitutional courts, arbitral tribunals have a limited mandate—

116
See Sergio Puig, No Right without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 829, 848 (2014).
117
See Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment
Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 389-90 (2015).
118
See Puig, supra note 116, at 844.
119
Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International
Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 729 (2009).
120
See Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta Sunt
Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and
Recent Cases, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2014, at 1.
121
See Roberts, supra note 117, at 389-91.
122
Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos?: Foreign Investment Law as a Complex
Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 372, 404 (2014).
123
Roberts, supra note 117, at 390.
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that is, to arbitrate legal disputes arising directly out of a foreign
investment.124
Moreover, while constitutions generally recognise a range of
individual rights, the literature is divided on the question of
whether IIAs recognise individual rights or whether they remain
traditional state-to-state international instruments. In other words,
to whom are investment treaty obligations owed? Do investors have
rights under IIAs? If so, what is the nature of their entitlements?
These questions remain unsettled.125
For Anthea Roberts,
“[i]nvestment treaties should be reconceptualized as triangular
treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign states that create
enforceable rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party
beneficiaries.”126 Others point out that international treaties can
confer individual rights and that “[i]nvestment treaties . . . adopt
terminology consistent with the vesting of rights in foreign nationals
and legal entities directly.”127 Some scholars have questioned
whether IIAs that prescribe investor-state arbitration grant foreign
investors truly substantive rights.128 Rather, they argue that
investors hold mere procedural rights.129 The jurisprudence is
divided. Some arbitral tribunals have held the view that IIAs create
substantive inter-state obligations but do not provide individual
substantive rights.130 Other tribunals have come to opposite
conclusions.131

124
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
125
See FILIP BALCERZAK, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 23738 (2017); see also Francisco González de Cossío, Investment Protection Rights:
Substantive or Procedural?, 26 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 107, 122 (2011) (“not
only can reasonable minds differ, but brilliant minds [sic] too”).
126
Roberts, supra note 117, at 353.
127
Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 183 (2004).
128
See Caroline Foster, A New Stratosphere? Investment Treaty Arbitration as
‘Internationalized Public Law,’ 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 461, 474-76 (2015).
129
Id. at 474-75.
130 E.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, ¶ 157-58 (Nov. 21, 2007).
131 See, e.g., Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 167 (Jan. 15, 2008) (finding that
NAFTA confers substantive rights on investors).
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Finally, even the remedies are different. “[C]onstitutional
court[s] may have the power to strike down norms [they] deem[]
unconstitutional—a power international investor-state arbitral
tribunals lack. On the other hand, international investment law may
allow investors to claim damages in circumstances where national
law provides no remedy” due to the principle of the separation of
powers.132
iii.

Conclusions

In conclusion, despite functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are
not global constitutional courts. Whether international law in
general, and international investment law in particular,133 have
undergone processes of constitutionalisation remains an open
question. It seems that both international investment law and
investment treaty arbitration currently lack constitutional density.
At the procedural level, as mentioned above, while there are some
elements of functional analogy, there certainly is no equivalence
between constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration
for the time being. As previously illustrated, arbitral tribunals and
constitutional courts have different structural and functional
features.
With regard to the question of whether the system should be
constitutionalized, there is a risk that arbitrators favour a Western
type of “constitution” centered on property rights and procedural
guarantees, entrench neoliberal policies, and prevent exploration of
alternative relationships between states, foreign investors, and local
communities. However, the fact that international investment law
lacks constitutional density does not mean that it cannot acquire this
trait in the future through treaty-making,134 via the inclusion of non132
Lorenzo Cotula, Democracy and International Investment Law, 30 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 351, 359 (2017).
133
See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 55 (arguing that there are elements of
constitutionalisation in investor-state arbitration).
134
See, e.g., Gus Van Harten, The European Commission and UNCTAD Reform
Agendas: Do They Ensure Independence, Openness, and Fairness in Investor-State
Arbitration?, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: MORE
BALANCED, LESS ISOLATED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED 128 (Steffen Hindelang &
Markus Krajewski eds., 2016).
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economic considerations in the preambles and text of IIAs.135 This
would not necessarily be sufficient to turn IIAs into constitutional
agreements, but it would certainly humanise them; and such
humanisation seems to reflect a common objective of both
international lawyers and constitutionalists, as well as industrialised
and developing countries. For the reasons examined previously,
and for the time being, investment treaty arbitration seems more
similar to other international dispute settlement mechanisms than to
constitutional adjudication.
III.

ARE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS?

After having clarified that arbitral tribunals are not
constitutional courts and that they have different structural and
substantive features, and having examined the pitfalls of a
constitutionalist approach to international investment law and
arbitration, it seems appropriate to investigate the promises of
constitutional theory. Can constitutional theory remain useful in
investigating international investment law and arbitration? In
particular, this Part argues that not only is dialogue between arbitral
tribunals and constitutional courts feasible, but it is also useful and
desirable. Both constitutionalists and international lawyers argue
for a humanisation of international investment law and support
some reforms of the system. Both sets of scholars suggest that
arbitrators should consider non-economic values in the settlement
of investment disputes. At least one of the sources of international
law, i.e., general principles of law, can have a domestic gestalt:
principles of comparative constitutional law can be a source of

135
See Stephan Schill, Towards a Constitutional Law Framework for Investment
Law Reform, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-aconstitutional-law-framework-for-investment-law-reform/
[https://perma.cc/XN7V-4UFP] (“perspective is mandated for the European
Union (EU) by Article 21 TEU[,] which requires the EU’s external action to be
guided by its own constitutional principles, namely ‘democracy, the rule of law, the
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect
for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

768

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:3

international law.136 This is the point where constitutionalists and
international lawyers converge to such a significant extent as to
make the boundaries between the fields almost indistinguishable.
Therefore, it is argued in this section that fruitful dialogue can take
place between constitutional adjudication and investor-state
arbitration. After briefly examining the tenet of international law
requiring states to comply with international law even if doing so
were in conflict with constitutional law, the section examines the
way constitutional theory can influence and has influenced areas of
international investment law.
As mentioned, a traditional tenet of international law requires
states to comply with international law, even if doing so would be
in conflict with constitutional law.137 It is also a “self-evident”
principle in international law that states that have contracted valid
international obligations are “bound to make in [their] legislation
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of
the obligations undertaken.”138 In some cases, international
investment law has spurred domestic constitutional reform—for
instance, requiring a stronger protection of property rights.139
136
Id. (suggesting that “[t]hese principles could be used not only to provide a
more balanced interpretation of investment treaties . . . but also to structure a global
investment law reform agenda”).
137 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or
Speech in Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, ¶¶
62-63 (Feb. 4) (“[A] State cannot adduce as against another State its own
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
international law or treaties in force. . . . The application of the Danzig Constitution
may . . . result in the violation of an international obligation incumbent on Danzig
towards Poland, whether under treaty stipulations or under general international
law. . . . However, in cases of such a nature, it is not the Constitution and other
laws, as such, but the international obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of
the Free City.”)
138 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Greece v. Turkey, Advisory
Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, ¶ 52 (Feb. 21).
139
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58; Juliana Gomez,
Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia. Does the Colombian General Regime for
Foreign Direct Investment Comply with the International Standards? 56 (Dec. 1,
2001)
(L.L.M.
Thesis,
University
of
Georgia
School
of
Law),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context
=stu_llm [https://perma.cc/UQ9U-6H4W] (pointing out that in 1999, Article 58 of
the Colombian Constitution was modified, repealing the provision that permitted
the government to expropriate private property for equity reasons without
compensation because expropriation without compensation discouraged
prospective investors to invest in Colombia).
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However, constitutional law principles can influence and have
influenced areas of international investment law. The interaction
between constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration
has been particularly fruitful, and it is the focus of this section. Such
interaction has occurred in five different ways: first, treaty-makers
have deliberately borrowed given legal tools from constitutional
jurisprudence, thus enabling arbitrators to use some constitutional
language in interpreting treaty provisions; second, arbitral tribunals
have referred to the decisions of constitutional courts; third,
constitutional principles can become general principles of
international law or even customary international law under certain
circumstances; fourth, arbitral tribunals also adjudicate on the
compliance of constitutional law with international investment law;
finally, domestic courts have also challenged the authority of
arbitral tribunals by adjudicating on the constitutionality of IIAs,
and this has given rise to ongoing power struggles.140 This Section
briefly examines these various types of interaction between
constitutional adjudication and investor-state arbitration, dividing
these into three principal categories: (1) legal transplants and cross
pollination; (2) general principles of law; and (3) reciprocal checks
and balances.
a. Legal Transplants and Cross-Pollination
The first two types of interaction between constitutional
adjudication and investor-state arbitration, legal transplants and
cross-pollination, often take place hand in hand, as one type of
interaction can anticipate the other. First, treaty-makers have
transplanted constitutional ideas, not only as articulated in domestic
constitutions, but also as developed by constitutional courts, into
international investment treaties.141 For instance, the provisions
against indirect expropriation in a number of IIAs—most notably
See infra Section III.c.
George A. Bermann, Comparative Law and International Organizations, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 241, 249 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo
Mattei eds., 2012) (“The treaty drafters [of the European Union] most certainly
canvassed the domestic systems of both the member states and non-member states
. . . in crafting a judicial architecture.”).
140
141
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the US Model BIT—derive from U.S. constitutional adjudication,
specifically, the Penn Central test, articulated by the United States
Supreme Court.142 In parallel, as the 2012 U.S. Model BIT often
serves as a template in investment treaty negotiations, the Lex
Americana has become the gold standard in the field.143 This process
has not been uncontroversial or uncontested. Some commentators
have argued that the extensive protection granted to investors’
rights amounts to an extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.144
Second, arbitral tribunals have relied on the jurisprudence of
constitutional courts for functional reasons, such as understanding
the meaning of treaty provisions, identifying general principles of
law, and filling a gap in a particular law.145 When adjudicators face
142 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (laying
out the general guidelines for determining whether a regulatory taking has
occurred).
143
José E. Alvarez, Evolving BIT, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Ian A. Laird, Todd Weiler & Nina P. Mocheva eds., 2010).
144
Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 30 (2003) (“Despite claims that NAFTA
simply ‘exports’ the U.S. takings standard, the tribunals’ interpretations of the
expropriation provision have exceeded the substantive scope of U.S. compensation
requirements while removing procedural limitations typically imposed on
domestic takings claims.”); Gregory M. Starner, Taking a Constitutional Look: NAFTA
Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States’ Constitutional Protection of Property, 33 L.
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 405, 436 (2002) (“The movement towards multilateral free trade
regimes will test the international community's commitment to open markets and
protecting foreign investment at the expense of state sovereignty.”); see generally
David Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 537 (1996) (“Just as trade experts should now
become more familiar with American constitutional law principles, so will
Canadian constitutionalists have to be equipped to understand the significant
reshaping of our background rules which previously were the subject of Canadian
constitutional text and convention.”).
145 See, e.g., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of
America, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Award, ¶ 134 (Jan. 12, 2011) (“The
Respondent cited in this regard multiple decisions by both U.S and Canadian courts
holding that the Jay Treaty does not authorize indigenous persons’ duty-free
passage of commercial goods.”); Id. ¶ 137 (“In the Tribunal’s understanding, U.S.
federal Indian law is a complex and not altogether consistent mixture of
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and judicial decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court and other courts. Determining the contents of that law, and its
likely impact on particular types of state regulation, often calls for necessarily
uncertain predictions of how future courts will apply past decisions involving
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particularly difficult cases, resorting to other cases may provide
them with useful examples, facilitate their reasoning, and strengthen
their perceived legitimacy.146 The influence of borrowing extends
beyond the specific case, as it catalyses gravitation towards certain
models that exert dominant influence.147
Constitutional ideas elaborated by constitutional courts, such as
proportionality, reasonableness, and constitutional standards of
review, have migrated from constitutional law to the regional and
international sphere, allowing a dialogue between national
constitutional courts, on the one hand, and supranational courts and
tribunals, on the other.148 Such dialogue has also given rise to a
common lexicon, which nourishes the emergence of
commonalities149 and fosters the circular migration of constitutional
ideas from constitutional courts to regional and international fora
and then back to constitutional courts.150
different settings and different types of state regulation.”); Apotex Holdings Inc. v.
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ A.37 (Aug. 25,
2014) (“[W]ith the subsequent decision of the US Supreme Court in BG Group, the
Claimants’ concerns as to US law may now seem less well-founded, being based (as
they then were) upon the decision of the DC Court of Appeals, since reversed by
the US Supreme Court.” (citation omitted)); Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 162 (July 8, 2016)
(discussing the constitutionality of plain packaging before the Supreme Court of
Justice of Uruguay).
146
See Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality
Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 116 (2012).
147
See Colin B. Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural
Insights, in REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27, 40-42 (Leon E.
Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri eds., 2013) (noting the influence of international legal
culture on the development of the norms of international investment law).
148
See generally VALENTINA VADI, PROPORTIONALITY, REASONABLENESS AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2018)
(examining the merits and pitfalls of arbitral tribunals’ use of the concepts of
proportionality and reasonableness to review the compatibility of a state's
regulatory actions with its obligations under international investment law).
149
See David Feldman, Modalities of Internationalisation in Constitutional Law,
18 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 131 (2006).
150
Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and
International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 273 (2008) (“This article
has argued that the aspiration to ‘speak with one voice’ is shared by a growing
number of national courts across the globe. But, as opposed to what prevailed only
a decade ago, these courts no longer wish to speak with the voice of their
governments but, rather, to align their jurisprudence with that of other national
courts.”).
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Yet, arbitrators often rely on national cases without providing an
explanation of why they do so.151 If arbitrators rely on domestic
cases, there is a risk that they “cherry-pick” the cases that they are
more familiar with—namely those of the legal systems with which
they are acquainted. This possible selection bias increases the risks
of importing qualitative models that are not necessarily the best, but
rather those that are more familiar to the arbitrators.152
b. General Principles of Law
A third type of interaction between constitutional adjudication
and investor-state arbitration can contribute to the emergence of
general principles of law. In certain cases, constitutional ideas, as
articulated by constitutional courts, can give rise to the coalescence
of general principles of international law, thus contributing to the
development of international law.
International adjudicators have an important role in the
identification of general principles of law.153 General principles of
international law are defined as “a core of legal ideas which are
common to all civilized legal systems,”154 and they are a source of
international law.155 They express a belief in a common heritage of
151
VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 164 (2016) (“In addition, arbitrators may not be given comprehensive
evidence of national law, and this, in turn, may leave them likely to rely randomly
on readily available cases. Even if inclusive evidence is presented, arbitrators are
susceptible to cherry-picking, citing cases they are more familiar with and
overlooking others.”).
152
Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law,
53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 125, 153 (2005) (“Despite the tremendous progress in the field
over the last decade, causal inference—arguably, the ultimate goal of scientific
inquiry, quantitative or qualitative, positivist or hermeneutical—remains largely
beyond the purview of comparative constitutional law scholarship.”).
153
See generally LAURA PINESCHI, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY (2015) (examining the role played by domestic and international judges
in developing legal systems through their interpretation and application of general
principles of law).
154
Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized
by Civilized Nations, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (1957).
155
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 §1(c), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055; see also ANDREA GATTINI, ATTILA TANZI & FILIPPO FONTANELLI, GENERAL
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international law156 or common law of humankind,157 and they
contribute to the evolution of international law as a unitary legal
system. Often considered a dormant source of international law,
general principles of law can revive and govern a certain issue if
treaty law and customary law do not govern such an issue.
As is known, investment tribunals do interpret and apply
treaties. Nonetheless, because the provisions of such treaties are
often vague, and because of non liquet (that is, the arbitral duty to
rend an award even when the applicable law does not govern a
specific issue), arbitrators recur to customary law and general
principles of law to fill legal gaps in the applicable law and reach a
decision on a specific matter. For instance, in order to ascertain
whether the duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment
unduly affected investors’ rights or, rather, constituted a legitimate
exercise of state powers, the Maffezini tribunal acknowledged “the
general principle that ignorance of the law is no defense.”158 After
looking at whether other states also required such assessment, it
concluded, referring to Sands’ treatise on General Principles of
Environmental Law that “the Environmental Impact Assessment
procedure is fundamental for the adequate protection of the
environment and the application of appropriate preventive
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (2018) (addressing
selected general principles of law and assessing their functions in investment
arbitration); see generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953); Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of
Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 103, 103 (2009) (“It is
undisputed that ‘general principles have acquired a role in the shaping of rules in
the area of foreign investment protection’ and played ‘a prominent role in
arbitrations between States and foreign nationals.’” (quoting M. SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 94 (2d ed. 2004) & C. SHREUER, THE
ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 614 (2001))); Stephan W. Schill, General
Principles of Law and International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW. THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 133, 181 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De
Brabandere eds., 2012) (“Overall, general principles of public law thus appear as a
potent source of international law that has transformative potential for adapting
international investment law and the practice of investor-State arbitration without
modifying substance or procedure of the existing international law framework.”).
156
GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 11 (1958).
157
See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 132 (2005) (reviewing the historical roots of international law and its
impact on jurisprudential developments more generally).
158 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 70
(Nov. 13, 2000).
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measures. This is true, not only under Spanish and [the thenEuropean Economic Community (“EEC”) law, which is now
European Union] law, but also increasingly so under international
law.”159 What is the gestalt of general principles of law? General
principles of law can indicate: (1) principles that are common to
diverse legal systems (thus “having their roots in a local or national
Volkgeist”);160 or (2) principles recognised by the international
community (transcending national law).161 An example of a general
principle of municipal origin is that of requiring reparation as a
consequence of a wrongful act.162
The concepts of state
responsibility and reparation have their historical roots in the civil
law doctrines of extra-contractual liability and the remedy of
restoring an injured party to the situation which would have
prevailed had no injury been sustained (restitutio in integrum). Of
Roman law origins, such concepts entered into European civil codes
and from there successfully migrated to the international plane in
the early modern period.163 Examples of general principles of
international foundation include, for instance, the principle of nonintervention in national affairs.164 The international community
acknowledges both types of principles—irrespective of their legal
origin—as binding.165
Id. ¶ 67.
Schlesinger, supra note 154, at 742.
161
Christina Voigt, The Role of General Principles in International Law and Their
Relationship to Treaty Law, 31 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 3, 3, 7 (2008).
162 Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v Pol.), Claim for Indemnity, The Merits, 1928
P.C.I.J.
(ser.
A)
No.
17
(Sept.
13),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm
[https://perma.cc/HN8L-636N]; Opinion in the Lusitania Cases (Ger. v. U.S.), 7
R.I.A.A.
32
(1923),
https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_VII/32-44.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD88-46WX] (referring to common principles among different
legal systems “that remedy must be commensurate with the injury received”); see
also Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 55
(July
26),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow.htm
[https://perma.cc/3EEP-2LKS] (“It is a principle of international law that the
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation . . . .”).
163
See generally BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2011) (tracing the historical origins of
the concept of restitution and explaining how private law notions entered into
international law).
164
Voigt, supra note 161, at 8.
165
Id.
159
160
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The identification of the first type of general principles, those
that are common to diverse legal systems, entails two processes: (1)
the abstraction of the norm from national constitutions, legislations,
and judicial decisions (a vertical process); and (2) the comparison of
the national legal systems (a horizontal process) to distil the essence
of the legal concept.166 In ascertaining general principles of law,
what legal systems should be considered and how? As Fabián
Raimondo argues, “[i]f a legal principle derived from national legal
systems is going to be part of international law, then that legal
principle should arguably be more universally recognized.”167
As mentioned, international adjudicators have an important role
in the identification of general principles of law. This is of particular
relevance to investment arbitration because general principles can
fill the gap left open by short and vague investment treaties.
Moreover, if the protection of given non-economic interests—for
instance, cultural heritage—were proven to be a general principle of
international law, there would not be an obstacle for the
adjudicators to interpret investment treaty provisions in light of the
existence of these principles.
The international judge should avoid a mechanical transposition
of concepts from national law into international proceedings.168 For
instance, in Klöckner v. Cameroon, although the applicable law was
Cameroonian, the Arbitral Tribunal based its decision on the basic
“principle of loyalty” in contractual relations, borrowing it from
French civil law and noting (without reference) that it also belonged
to international law.169 The Annulment Committee annulled the
award, holding that the Arbitral Tribunal had failed to apply the
proper law and based its decision “more on a sort of general equity
than on positive law.”170 The adoption of “a narrow inquiry, which
at best attaches special weight and at worst confines the scope of the

166
FABIÁN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1 (2008).
167 Id. at 4.
168 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 178 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
169 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award (Oct. 21, 1983).
170 Klöckner v. Cameroon: Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 89, 114, 139 (1986) (noting that “[the Tribunal’s] reasoning [is]
limited to postulating and not demonstrating the existence of a principle”).
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review to a single, specific legal system”171 for the determination of
general principles of law can lead to the perception that
international adjudicators “interpret legal norms through the
lexicons of their respective traditions.”172 They risk “elevating legal
rules and concepts with which individual judges are familiar . . . to
the level of universal truths.”173 Although Klöckner did not involve
constitutional law, it illustrates analogous risks and opportunities
for the migration of constitutional principles to the international
level. If given principles were shared by the international
community, there would not be an obstacle to their consideration by
arbitral tribunals.
If general principles are derived from a limited set of Western
countries, questions arise as to whether this constitutes a form of
“legal imperialism,” understood as the grafting onto the global level
of hegemonic Western values, rather than an expression of
democratic global governance.
Constitutions are domestic
constructs and reflect the economic, social, and cultural choices of
domestic constituencies. Attempts to universalize the constitutional
peculiarities “of a certain type of western, liberal model of the state
(and its capitalist model of development)[] could be perceived[] in
developing countries as an instrument to reproduce the dominant
position of . . . industrialized countries and their economic
actors.”174
However, if a truly pluralist approach is adopted, then general
principles can emerge, and have emerged, requiring the protection
of interests, which are common to humankind. Any legal
framework, including constitutional law, is “the product of a
political context.”175 Therefore, the migration of constitutional ideas

171
Aldo Zammit Borda, Comparative Law and Ad Hoc Tribunals: The Dangers of
a Narrow Inquiry, 40 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 22, 35 (2012).
172
Id. at 36 (quoting Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and
the Hidden Art of International Criminal Trial Practice, 24 Conn. J. Int’l L. 243, 252
(2005)).
173
Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 949, 965
(2011).
174
Francesca Spagnuolo, Diversity and Pluralism in Earth System Governance:
Contemplating the Role for Global Administrative Law, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1875, 1875
(2011).
175
Christoph Möllers, Ten Years of Global Administrative Law, 13 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 469, 471 (2015).
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should not rely on methodological nationalism;176 rather, it “should
draw, as far as possible, on cross-cultural principles.”177 The
comparative legal analysis to detect general principles of law must
be extensive and representative, albeit not necessarily uniform or
universal.178
c. Reciprocal Checks and Balances
Finally, constitutional adjudication and investor-state
arbitration can exercise certain reciprocal checks and balances. On
the one hand, arbitral tribunals can adjudicate on the compliance of
the decisions of given constitutional courts and other domestic
courts with international investment law.179 Arbitrators may be
required to assess the compatibility of the decisions of given
domestic courts with the host state’s commitments under the
applicable IIA.180 Domestic court decisions are among the acts that
can cause a dispute and/or breach of international law,181 thus

176
Sabino Cassese, Global Administrative Law: The State of the Art, 13 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 465, 467 (2015) (stating that “it is not possible to rely on methodological
nationalism”).
177
Spagnuolo, supra note 174.
178
Borda, supra note 171, at 28.
179
Mavluda Sattorova, Denial of Justice Disguised? Investment Arbitration and
the Protection of Foreign Investors from Judicial Misconduct, 61 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q.
223, 223 (2012).
180
See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/21,
Award,
¶
213
(Nov.
30,
2017),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3745/DS1
0808_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8QT-U4ME].
181 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926
P.C.I.J.
(ser.
A)
No.
7,
¶
52
(May
25),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1926.05.25_silesia.htm
[https://perma.cc/H7KF-ERNY] (“From the standpoint of International Law and
of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the
will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions
or administrative measures. The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the
Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the Court’s giving judgment on
the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity
with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention.”).
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determining state responsibility, e.g., ascertaining whether the host
state acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.182
Arbitral tribunals may also refer to the jurisprudence of
domestic courts to validate their assessment of the illegitimacy of the
host state’s behaviour vis-à-vis the foreign investor.183 While the
unconstitutionality of a given regulatory measure does not
necessarily entail a breach of an investment treaty provision, it can
be a powerful indicator that there was a breach of the rule of law
and of investment treaty provisions, such as the fair and equitable
treatment provision. Vice versa, the constitutionality of a given
measure does not shield a governmental measure from review but
can matter in the decision-making process of the arbitral tribunal.
There may be cases in which constitutional decisions on a given
point of law may change, and therefore it may be difficult to assess
their impact on the final award.184 In certain cases, arbitral tribunals
may also be asked to apply norms of constitutional law, if the parties
to the dispute selected domestic law as the applicable law.185
182 Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/11/2,
Award,
¶
205
(Apr.
4,
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8G5-XCYH].
183 Saipem S.P.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/07,
Award,
¶
90
(June
30,
2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0734.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y37Q-EVKE].
184 Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award,
¶ 29 (Apr. 22, 2009), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/pdf/enbernardus-henricus-funnekotter-and-others-v-republic-of-zimbabwe-awardwednesday-22nd-april-2009 [https://perma.cc/VG8R-LBXB] (finding by the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe that the Fast Track Programme could not be
considered as meeting the requirement of the Constitution and “that the farm
invasions are, have been and continue to be unlawful”); Id. ¶33 (noting that “the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court, whose composition had been changed, . . . held that the
Land Reform Programme was constitutional and found that there was no breach of
the rule of law concerning actions taken on farms”); Id. ¶ 107 (deciding that “the
Tribunal concludes that Zimbabwe breached its obligation under Article 6(c) of the
BIT to pay just compensation to the Claimants”).
185 S. Am. Silver Ltd. (Berm.) v. Bol., PCA Case No 2013-15, Award, ¶ 199
(Nov.
22,
2018),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2536
[https://perma.cc/U89D-DAP3] (“In order to guarantee the protection of the
Indigenous Communities, the Tribunal must construe the Treaty in accordance
with five Bolivian laws and international law instruments: (i) the 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights; 248 (ii) the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the
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On the other hand, domestic and regional courts have also
challenged the authority of arbitral tribunals by adjudicating on the
constitutionality of IIAs and/or their dispute settlement
mechanisms, and this has given rise to ongoing power struggles.186
This move is part of a general wave of judicial review in which
national courts have increasingly scrutinized the constitutionality of
international law and re-asserted the primacy of the constitution
over international law.187 For instance, in Hupacasath v. Canada, the
Federal Court of Canada dismissed the claim that aboriginal people
should be consulted before the ratification of a BIT with China.188
Whereas the Hupacasath alleged that the ratification of such an
agreement could adversely affect their rights, the Court held that
impacts that could result from the ratification were speculative.189
Nonetheless, the decision has been subject to criticism, as scholars
have pointed out that risks to indigenous peoples’ land rights and
cultural traditions are far from being hypothetical.190 Certainly, an
increasing number of investor-state arbitrations have focused on the
interplay between constitutional and other domestic law provisions
on indigenous peoples’ rights and international investment law.191

Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women; (iii) ILO
Convention No. 169; (iv) the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and (v) the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia.”).
186
For earlier examples, see Sergio Puig, Investor–State Tribunals and
Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners Saga, 5 MEX. L. REV. 199, 222-33 (2013).
187
Versteeg, supra note 110, at 12 (noting that “the vast majority of countries
adopted constitutional safeguards to ensure the primacy of the domestic
constitution”).
188
Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Can.-China,
Sept.
9,
2012,
https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/china-chine/fipa-api
e/index.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/8SBL-5JWZ].
189 Hupacasath First Nation v. Minister of Foreign Affs. Can. and the Att’y
Gen. of Can., [2013] F.C. 900, ¶ 79 (Can.).
190
Kathryn Tucker, Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with International Trade
Agreements: Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada, 9 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.
L. & POL’Y 109, 127 (2013).
191
Valentina Vadi, Heritage, Power, and Destiny: The Protection of Indigenous
Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
725, 741 (2018).
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Some awards have also touched upon the state’s duty to consult
indigenous peoples in matters that can affect them.192
Analogously, in 2017, Belgium requested the CJEU ascertain the
compatibility of the Investment Court System provided in the
context of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between the European Union and Canada with EU law, including
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.193 The
CJEU concluded in Opinion 1/17 that this mechanism for the
settlement of investor-state disputes is compatible with the EU
treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.194

192 See Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 228 (Nov. 30, 2017) (stating that “[t]he Aymara population
demanded repeal of Supreme Decree 083, application and respect for the right of
prior consultation, and suspension of all mining concessions in southern Puno.”);
Id. ¶ 236 (holding by the Tribunal that “[e]ven if Amici’s description of events was
accurate, it implicates conduct of Respondent and not of Claimant. According to
Amici, it was Respondent’s grant of a large number of mining concessions in the
territories of the indigenous communities that triggered an anti-mining sentiment
in the population of Puno . . . . If Respondent was required but failed to consult
with local communities before granting rights over their lands . . . then any resulting
fallout from this lack of communication and transparency falls on Respondent, not
Claimant.”); Id. ¶ 262 (“The State’s responsibility extends to ensuring that the
affected communities are in fact consulted by private companies . . . .”). But see Bear
Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial
Dissenting Opinion of Professor Philippe Sands QC, ¶ 6 (Sept. 12, 2017) (arguing
that the investor failed to obtain the social license to operate and thus contributed
to the collapse of the project); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United
States of America, ICSID No. Arb/10/5, ¶ 182 (Jan. 12, 2011) (“[T]he Claimants
contended that Article 1105 [of the North America Free Trade Agreement] obliged
the Respondent to take ‘pro-active steps to consult with indigenous investors prior
to imposing a measure that will impact upon them or their community.’”); Id. ¶ 210
(holding by the Tribunal “[i]t may well be, as the Claimants urged, that there does
exist a principle of customary international law requiring governmental authorities
to consult indigenous peoples on governmental policies or actions significantly
affecting them”); Id. ¶ 211 (stating that “[i]n any event, any obligations requiring
consultation run between the state and indigenous peoples as such, that is, as
collectivities bound in community”).
193
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016,
2017
O.J.
(L11)
23,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/XW6V-NBQY].
194
Case C-1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, ¶ 106 (Apr. 30, 2019).
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By contrast, the CJEU recently ruled in Achmea that investorstate arbitration in intra-EU BITs was incompatible with EU law.195
In fact, whereas arbitral tribunals interpret or apply EU law, they
cannot refer questions of EU law to the CJEU for guidance.
Therefore, there is a risk that they will interpret and apply EU law
in a way that diverges from, or is incompatible with, the
constitutional heritage of EU law.196 Because the ruling is binding
on Member States, it will likely affect the intra-EU investment
regime. Nonetheless, given the fact that the ruling is not binding on
arbitral tribunals, its impact on international investment law
remains uncertain.197 In conclusion, whereas the Achmea decision
highlights the ongoing constitutionalisation of EU law in general,
and intra-EU investment law in particular, it does not necessarily
confirm the constitutionalisation of international investment law as
a whole.
IV.

METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND INTERCIVILIZATIONAL APPROACHES TO INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION

After having examined the promises and pitfalls of the
application of constitutionalist theory to investor-state arbitration,
this Section contends that other theories or methods can help
examine, and eventually suggest reforms for, international
investment law and arbitration. The argument focuses on the
existence of a plurality of different methods and approaches, and in
this respect, provides a brief overview of inter-civilizational
approaches as a particularly promising path.
Methodological pluralism is not only the current state of the art,
but also a promising endeavour, as international law scholars may
adopt different methods depending on the given object of inquiry.
Methodological pluralism is based on the belief that no research
195
See generally Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 (Mar. 6, 2018) (holding that the arbitration clause contained in
the Netherlands–Slovakia BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and
is therefore incompatible with EU law).
196
Id.
197 Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany (II), ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea Issue, ¶ 85 (Aug. 31, 2018).
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method is inherently superior to any other. Not only does a
plurality of methods align with the international community’s value
of cultural diversity, but it is also best suited to address the
complexity of international law. This is not to say that anything
goes. Rather, the adoption of multiple perspectives and “different
ways of seeing international law” on given topics are not only
plausible, but are desirable depending on the research aim and
objective.198 Methodological pluralism acknowledges the existence
of different methods, their distinct usefulness, and their
complementarity.
For instance, methodological statism—the traditional focus of
international lawyers on states as the principal actors of
international law—can be complemented by methodological
individualism, that is, a commitment to studying the making,
interpretation, implementation, and development of international
law by ordinary, individual people.199 Analogously, while the
macro-history of international investment law seeks out large and
long-term trends in the field, looking at multiple events and
concepts over the course of centuries, the micro-histories of
international investment law typically reduce the scale of analysis200
by focusing on specific events, legal items or individuals.201
A discrete set of methodologies exists in international law.202
Because of space limits and the allocated topic of discussion, this
BIANCHI, supra note 98, at 225.
Tamar Megiddo, Methodological Individualism, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 21920 (2019).
200
For more on the history of international investment law, see generally
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND HISTORY (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams
& Rainer Hofmann eds. 2018); ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012);
KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT
AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013); FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF
COMMERCE: CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH–18TH CENTURY (1982); CHARLES
LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157 (2005); Janet McLean,
The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND. L.J. 363 (2004).
201
Valentina Vadi, Perspective and Scale in the Architecture of International Legal
History, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 53 (2019); Valentina Vadi, The Power of Scale: International
Law and Microhistories, 46 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 315 (2018).
202
Annie-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, Appraising the Methods of
International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999); Jutta Brunnée
198
199
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Part is clearly not exhaustive but suggests possible promising paths
for future investigation of international law in general, and in
international investment law in particular. These alternative
approaches offer different views and perspectives of international
law. They can help international lawyers to build different
theoretical maps of international law in general, and international
investment law in particular. International lawyers, administrative
law scholars, critical legal scholars, socio-legal scholars, and even
political theorists have contributed some important insights to the
field.203 Similarly, the history and theory of international law has
also been enriched by TWAILers.204 Human rights scholars’
investigations on economic, social, and cultural rights can also shed
light on the interplay between the protection of human rights and
the promotion of foreign investments.205 This is not to say that
international investment law should be the exclusive preserve of any
of these approaches. Rather, the study of the field is open to interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary perspectives, and the adoption
of diverse perspectives and approaches can only facilitate the
understanding of its multifaceted complexity. The plurality of
analytical frameworks may help address the problems that a purely

& Stephen J. Toope, Constructivisim and International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF
THE ART 119 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); HILARY
CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000); Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Beyond the (Post)Colonial:
TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law, 45 L. & POL. AFR., ASIA & LAT. AM.
195, 195-99 (2012); ANGHIE, supra note 87.
203
See, e.g., Amanda Perry-Kessaris, What Does it Mean to Take a Socio-Legal
Approach to International Economic Law?, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 3, 3-8 (Amanda PerryKessaris ed., 2013); Celine Tan, Reviving the Emperor’s Old Clothes: The Good
Governance Agenda, Development and International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 147 (Stephen W. Schill,
Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2015).
204
See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A
Manifesto, in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND
GLOBALIZATION 47 (Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson & Obiora
Okafor eds., 2003).
205
See, e.g., Hans Morten Haugen, Trade and Investment Agreements: What Role
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Economic Law?, in ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES 227 (Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca & Christophe Golay eds., 2014).
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constitutionalist approach cannot address, or that the latter only
helps to address in a limited fashion.
Among the many ways to investigate and study international
law, an inter-civilizational or intercultural perspective of the field
seems promising. Such approach is based on the recognition of the
plurality of civilizations and cultures that have long existed
throughout history.206 It requires international lawyers to be
sensitive to different values and concerns of different cultures “both
within a civilization (intra-civilization diversity)” and among
civilizations “(inter-civilizational cultures).”207 In other words, if
international law constitutes the law governing different
civilizations and cultures, it should “listen to the voices of them all”
and “be able to include different voices.”208 Civilizations should
dialogue with one another. An inter-civilization approach to
international law highlights the plurality of the cultures that
compose it209 and “calls for international law to embrace its
universal potential” by becoming a bridge among different
communities.210
Such an approach can be well suited to examine international
investment law, a field in which a great variety of interactions
between different regimes systematically occur and that is
characterized by legal pluralism. Some scholars pragmatically
argue that the twenty-first century will be multi-centric and multicivilizational, and that international law should evolve accordingly.
Nonetheless, a multi-civilizational approach can benefit all
concerned. The regulation of economic activities is not only
necessary but also desirable.211 In fact, a “distinct awareness” has
emerged that “states’ regulatory capacity must regain legitimacy as

YASUAKI 2017, supra note 59.
Id. at 19 n.14.
208
Ming Li, The Transcivilizational Perspective: A Legitimate and Feasible
Approach to International Law, 9 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 165, 166 (2019).
209
Yasuaki 2004, supra note 59; YASUAKI 2017, supra note 59.
210
Bruno Simma & Daniel Litwin, International Law in a Transcivilizational
World: An Intimate Account of International Law, JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. (forthcoming)
(on file with author).
211
YASUAKI 2017, supra note 59, at 485.
206
207
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an instrument for . . . promoting the general interest.”212 Many
states—in both industrialised and developing countries—have
gradually recalibrated their IIAs inserting reference to their
fundamental interests and values, as well as their inherent right to
regulate.213 These concerns may vary depending on the needs and
priorities of specific countries.
For instance, Canada has
traditionally inserted a cultural exception in its treaties and
provisions protecting its indigenous peoples.214 The United States,
Canada, and Mexico have expressly recognised “their inherent right
to regulate and . . . protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as health, safety, environmental protection, conservation of living or
non-living exhaustible natural resources, integrity and stability of
the financial system, and public morals” in the preamble of the
United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (“USMCA”)
that replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement.215
An inter-civilizational approach can be particularly well suited
to examine international investment arbitration. As Won Kidane
has highlighted, “[f]ew, if any, legal processes regularly bring
together multiple legal cultures into one room as much as
international arbitration does.”216 In this regard, the gradual
opening of investor-state arbitration to experts from all around the
globe could strengthen perceptions of its demographic
representativeness. Such opening can also foster the public
perception of investor-state arbitration’s capability to settle disputes
in an independent and impartial way. For instance, based on the
estimates by the World Bank for 2017, women account for 49.6% of
the world’s population. It would be fair to expect a similar
percentage of women with respect to the total number of
212
Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Regulating Trade, Investment and Money, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 352, 361 (James Crawford & Martti
Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
213
See generally José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223
(2011) (discussing different international investment agreements that have
incorporated the rights of nations).
214
Vadi, supra note 191, at 775.
215
Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada Pmbl., Dec. 10, 2019 [hereinafter USMCA],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/00_P
reamble.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDT7-72KM].
216
WON L. KIDANE, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (2017); see
also Tom Ginsberg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335 (2003).
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appointments.217 In the same fashion, it would be fair to expect in
arbitrations dealing with given countries, that at least one arbitrator
be designated from the same continent and/or region as such given
country. In disputes dealing with investments in indigenous
peoples’ lands, it would be fair to have at least one arbitrator of the
same culturally distinct group. In this regard, the United Nations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”)—the UN’s
central coordinating body for matters relating to the concerns and
rights of the world’s indigenous peoples—could provide expert
opinions and keep a list of experts on indigenous rights.
An inter-civilizational approach can also address particular
realities of local communities.218 Different sectors of society—
including women,219 local communities,220 and minorities—
influence, benefit from, and are affected by, foreign investments in
different ways. An inter-civilizational approach would consider the
impact of a given decision on local communities.221 Under this
perspective, arbitral tribunals should:
[M]ake the most of the different normative perspectives
that converge into the subject under debate . . . . Contrary
217
Data, Population, Female (% of Total Population), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl.fe.zs [https://perma.cc/AJ8T7353].
218
Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 251 (2007) (discussing
arbitral tribunals’ reluctance to consider communities’ perspectives); Valentina
Vadi, Local Communities, Cultural Heritage and International Economic Law, in LOCAL
ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 150 (Ljilijana
Biukovic & Pitman B. Potter eds., 2017).
219
See generally Rachel J Anderson, Environment, Foreign Investment and Gender,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT AND INVESTMENT LAW 441 (Kate Miles ed.,
2019) (discussing the intersection of international law and foreign investment
through a gender-lenses analysis and research and identifying potential issues).
220
See generally LJILJANA BIUKOVIC & PITMAN POTTER, LOCAL ENGAGEMENT WITH
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2017) (providing analysis on
global regulation and organizations on domestic laws and communities).
221
Hélène Tigroudja, Elimination de la pauvreté, droits de l’homme et
développement durable, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT FROM RIO TO RIO +20, at 161 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Sandrine MaljeanDubois & Stefania Negri eds., 2014) (stressing the need of mainstreaming gender,
poverty and environmental justice in developmental policies); MARGOT SALOMON,
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
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to the pursuit of [an abstract] ideal of justice that would
correspond . . . to
an
enlightened
constitutional
architecture of the world . . . the quest for justice . . .
would better avail of ‘critical scrutiny from the
perspective of others.’222
The recent Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. República de Panamá
can provide a useful example of how an inter-civilizational
perspective can work in the practice of investor-state arbitration.223
In 2015, a Costa Rican company and several Dutch investors, all
shareholders of an ecotourism project called Cañaveral in Bocas del
Toro, Panama, filed a claim against Panama at the ICSID.224 The
investors contested decisions made by the Panamanian National
Land Management Agency about whether the claimants’ property
was located within the protected area inhabited by the Ngöbe Buglé
indigenous peoples in Western Panama.225 The Ngöbe land
originally extended from the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Sea and
the tribes have traditionally relied on subsistence activities such as
farming, fishing, and hunting.226 Today, they mostly live in the
Comarca Ngöbe-Buglé, which is an area specifically designated to
protect the cultural heritage and the political autonomy of these
indigenous communities.227 The 1997 law establishing the Comarca
Ngöbe-Buglé recognised the right of indigenous persons to
collective ownership of land and prohibited private property within
these zones, as well as granting indigenous tribes a certain degree of
222
Palombella, supra note 99, at 383 (quoting AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE 197 (2009)).
223 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Award (Oct. 12, 2018).
224 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Request for Arbitration (Apr. 20, 2015).
225 See Clovis Trevino, Panama Faces New ICSID Arbitration Over Thwarted Hotel
Tourism Development, INV. ARB. REP. (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www-iareportercom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/panama-faces-new-icsid-arbitration-overthwarted-hotel-tourism-development/ [https://perma.cc/FL3M-8L9R].
226
Cindy Campbell, “Give Them a Dam Break!” Protecting the Ngäbe Buglé
Community of Panama with Clean Development Mechanism Safeguards to Promote
Culturally Sensitive Development, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 547, 547 (2014).
227 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Reasoning of the Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections
pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5), ¶ 22 (Apr. 4, 2016); Álvarez y Marín
Corporación S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/14, Award, ¶ 206 (Oct. 12, 2018).
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autonomy.228 In the region, only land that has been privately-held
before 1997 can be sold to private parties, and Comarca’s authorities
retain a right of preferential acquisition of any privately-owned land
for sale.229 Human rights scholars have interpreted this and similar
laws to constitute “one of the foremost achievements in terms of the
protection of indigenous rights in the world.”230
The investment at the heart of the dispute included “farm
properties situated along the Panamanian coast, which the investors
planned to develop as an eco-tourist project.”231 The investors
bought these properties, supposedly belonging to the Comarca,
from an intermediary who bought such properties and resold them
to the investors.232 Because the press questioned the legitimacy of
the acquisition, the National Authority for Lands Administration
“issued a report that officially located two of the claimants’
properties outside this special zone.”233 However, the report
ostensibly “provoked a wave of indignation among the indigenous
population”234 and “this led to the invasion of these properties by

228 Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi v. Panama, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 284, ¶ 59 (Oct. 14, 2014); Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A., ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Award, ¶ 208 (Oct. 12, 2018).
229 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Award, ¶ 208 (Oct. 12, 2018).
230
James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples),
The Status of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Panama, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1 (July 3, 2014).
231
Zoe Williams, Arbitrators in Panama Eco-Tourism BIT Dispute Weigh in With
Ruling on Preliminary Objections, INV. ARB. REP. (Apr. 13, 2016), https://wwwiareporter-com.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/arbitrators-in-panama-ecotourism-bit-dispute-weigh-in-with-ruling-on-preliminary-objections/
[https://perma.cc/24A4-CYWL].
232
Damien Charlotin & Facundo Perez Aznar, In Previously-Unseen Alvarez y
Marin v. Panama Award, Reasons Are Revealed for Why a Majority Declined to Take
Jurisdiction Over Investment in Indigenous Territory – And Why Grigera Naon Dissented,
INV.
ARB.
REP.
(Mar.
13,
2019),
https://www-iareportercom.pennlaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/in-previously-unseen-alvarez-y-marin-vpanama-award-reasons-are-revealed-for-why-a-majority-declined-to-takejurisdiction-over-investment-in-indigenous-territory-and-why-grigera-naondissented/ [https://perma.cc/F4NW-QQEP].
233 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Reasoning of the Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections
pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) (Spanish), ¶ 26 (Apr. 4, 2016).
234
Charlotin & Perez Aznar, supra note 232.
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indigenous groups.”235 The claimants alleged that Panama’s
treatment of their investment constituted an indirect expropriation
and a breach of the fair and equitable treatment as well as the full
protection and security standards.236 Panama denied having
violated the treaties and raised several jurisdictional objections,
arguing mainly that the investments had been unlawfully
acquired.237
The arbitral tribunal declined jurisdiction over the case on the
basis of the investors’ lack of compliance with domestic law.238
Although neither of the two treaties invoked by the investors
contained an express requirement of legality, the tribunal held that
a legality requirement should be deemed implicit in all investment
treaties, so that only investments acquired legally could benefit from
a treaty’s protection.239 The tribunal noted that the law establishing
the Comarca and the Panamanian Constitution aimed at protecting
indigenous peoples’ cultural, economic, and social well-being.240 It
also considered the commonality of land as a fundamental condition
for the survival and continuity of the ethnic identity of indigenous
peoples.241 While fully applying the applicable law, and thus
remaining within its own jurisdiction, the tribunal acknowledged
the plurality of existing cultures within Panama.
An inter-civilization perspective acknowledges “the pluralist
structure of international law.”242 Arbitral tribunals do not need to
become constitutional courts to adjudicate investment disputes;
235 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Reasoning of the Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections
pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5) (Spanish), ¶ 27 (Apr. 4, 2016).
236
Id. ¶ 28.
237 Id. ¶ 28.
238 Álvarez y Marín Corporación S.A. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/14, Award, ¶ 296 (Oct. 12, 2018) (“The Court has decided that investments
in which the investor, when making them, has committed in a serious breach of
national law, do not deserve international law protection.”).
239 Id. ¶ 118 (noting that “the requirement of legality, although not explicitly
stated in the Treaties, is an implicit part of the concept of protected investment”).
240
Id. ¶ 318-19 (referring to Article 127 of the Panamanian Constitution).
241
Id. ¶ 327 (describing that “communal lands are considered a fundamental
component to the survival and continuation of the ethnic identity of indigenous
people”).
242
NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010).
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traditional tools of treaty interpretation enable them to reach fair
decisions based on the applicable law and within the jurisdictional
mandate of the tribunals. Arbitral tribunals have interpretive tools
to address human rights and jus cogens issues without overstepping
their jurisdiction.243
De lege lata, skilled arbitrators could and should complete their
system of values by referring to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)244 to consider IIAs
within the broader system of international law. In fact, customary
norms of treaty interpretation, as restated by the VCLT, require that
in interpreting and applying IIAs, arbitral tribunals also take into
account other norms of public international law that are applicable
between the parties. Such systematic interpretation could provide
scope for considering non-economic concerns in the settlement of
investment disputes.245 The admissibility of counterclaims brought
by host states has also contributed to recalibrating some recent
investor-state arbitration.
De lege ferenda, international investment law is undergoing a
phase of reforms; such reforms will gradually introduce a muchneeded consideration of non-economic concerns in the text of
investment treaties. It is too early to say whether these substantive
reforms contribute to the much-needed humanisation of the field.
The European Commission is engaged in multilateral discussions to
establish a Multilateral Investment Court.246 If this approach is
successful, a multilateral court could arguably promote the
consideration of human rights and cultural diversity; however, it is
too early to tell.
243
Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights and International Investment Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 183 (Markus Krajewski &
Rhea Tamara Hoffmann eds., 2019); Valentina Vadi, Jus Cogens in International
Investment Law and Arbitration, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 357 (2015).
244
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331.
245
Nonetheless, the actual practice of tribunals on this issue remains
contradictory. Various tribunals have approached Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in
different ways, either ignoring it or interpreting it in an expansive or restrictive
way. In fact, the VCLT principles hardly ever lead to obvious outcomes, but merely
describe the structure of an interpretive argumentation.
246
Cecilia Malmström, European Comm’r for Trade, Speech at the Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: A Multilateral Investment Court: A Contribution to the
Conversation about Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157512.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NMU7-A9Q2].
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In conclusion, investor-state arbitration constitutes a form of
international adjudication. Non-economic concerns are already
within the grasp of arbitrators de lege lata, despite the call for de lege
ferenda improvements. If the domestic law is the applicable law,
then certainly arbitrators can consider local concerns. Due to
international human rights law, international law also enables
arbitrators to consider the inherent rights of indigenous peoples and
local communities. In fact, human rights are rights inherent to all
human beings.247 If arbitrators are willing to fully apply Article
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, then the consideration of relevant noneconomic concerns would already be within their grasp. The force
of systemic interpretation should not be overstated though. Future
reforms of the international investment regime in general, and the
eventual creation of a Multilateral Investment Court in particular,
may lead to some fundamental changes in the system and hopefully
increase its humanisation, thus making it work for the common
good.
V. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
This Article has examined whether arbitral tribunals can be
considered to be global constitutional courts and addressed the
merits and pitfalls of constitutionalist approaches to the role that this
dispute settlement mechanism plays in international relations. In
particular, it has stressed that structural and functional differences
exist between arbitral tribunals and constitutional courts. Therefore,
247
G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). The Declaration was approved by 143 nations,
but was opposed by the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
However, these four nations subsequently endorsed the Declaration. See
Antonietta Di Blase & Valentina Vadi, Introducing the Inherent Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, in THE INHERENT RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19,
19-20 (Antonietta Di Blase & Valentina Vadi eds., 2020). Drafted with the active
participation of indigenous representatives, the Declaration constitutes the
outcome of two decades of preparatory work. See id. at 20. While this landmark
instrument is currently not binding, this may change in the future to the extent that
its provisions reflect customary international law. See id. Compare G.A. Res. 61/295,
annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007) pmbl., para. 7, with G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), pmbl.
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investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) should not be seen as
analogous to global constitutional adjudication, but as a type of
international adjudication.
Nonetheless, constitutional theory remains useful because a
fruitful dialogue exists between arbitral tribunals and constitutional
courts. Not only can dialogue between constitutional courts and
arbitral tribunals promote the humanisation of international
investment law, but it can also foster state compliance with
international law and enhance the perceived legitimacy of
international investment law and arbitration. For instance, the
convergence between the substantive decisions of constitutional
courts and arbitral tribunals concerning the legitimacy of tobacco
control measures indicates that non-economic concerns have an
important role to play, not only in constitutional adjudication, but
also in international adjudication.248
This convergence can
contribute to highlight the human dimension of international
investment law, the idea that like other branches of law, such as
constitutional law, it is functional to human well-being, the respect
of human dignity, and the pursuit of the common good.249
International and constitutionalist approaches to investor-state
arbitration are neither radically incompatible universes, nor Russian
dolls, which nest simply and harmoniously one within the other.
Rather, each perspective contributes to destabilising the other by
obliging it to reconsider the implicit assumptions on which it rests.
At the same time, international and constitutionalist approaches can
also improve one another by engaging in a fruitful dialogue,
acknowledging common ground (namely, the objective of
humanizing international investment law) and making it more
permeable to non-economic interests and values.
International law poses vertical constraints on the state’s right to
regulate by introducing “global interests into the decision-making
processes of domestic authorities.”250
Adherence to these
248
Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark
Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT‘L. L. 93
(2012).
249
Ursula Kriebaum, Human Rights and International Investment Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INVESTMENT 13 (Yannick Radi ed.,
2018).
250
Stefano Battini, The Procedural Side of Legal Globalization: The Case of the
World Heritage Convention, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 340, 343 (2011).
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international regimes “add[s] a circuit of ‘external accountability,’
forcing domestic authorities to consider the interests of the wider
global constituency affected by their decisions.”251 International law
requires states to attune their legal systems to norms and values
shared by the international community. It can protect individuals
against arbitrary exercises of power by domestic authorities.
Therefore, it can humanise public law by improving its efficiency,
effectiveness, and—ideally—its responsiveness to human needs,
and by challenging public law to find new ways to protect
individuals against abuses of power.
In parallel, constitutionalist perspectives can contribute to the
progress of international law. They provide “a discrete set of lenses
with which to understand reality and a distinct toolkit with which
to dissect such reality.”252 They allow scholars and practitioners to
look at international law with fresh eyes and identify patterns and
structures in the chaotic development of international law. As
Joseph Weiler points out, constitutional theory has “introduced a
methodology with which to discuss, critique and . . . reform” the
operation of international organisations.253 Not only has it provided
international lawyers with new methods of enquiry for examining
their field, but it can also offer some thinking that might eventually
lead to a change in international law.254 Constitutional theory can
help scholars “to better understand the[] functions” and limits of
international organisations and adjudicators.255 It offers scholars
and practitioners a singular way of “mapping the global disorder of
normative orders.”256 It is a theoretical tool to examine the

Id. at 364.
J. H. H. Weiler, GAL at a Crossroads: Preface to the Symposium, 13 INT’L. J.
CONST. L. 463, 463 (2015).
253
Id.
254 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece
Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99; Corte Costituzionale (Corte Cost.)
(Constitutional
Court),
22
October
2014,
n.
238
(It.)
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgment
s/S238_2013_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5R-ZN9D].
255
Lorenzo Casini, Beyond Drip-Painting? Ten Years of GAL and the Emergence
of a Global Administration, 13 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 473, 477 (2015).
256
Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global
Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 373, 373 (2008).
251
252
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phenomenon of the “glocalization” of law.257 Glocalization refers to
the interrelatedness between, and co-presence of, the global and the
local, the universal and the particular, heterogeneity and
homogeneity, integration and dispersion.258 It describes “the
tempering effects of local conditions on global pressures.”259 The
glocalization of law indicates the relevance and belonging of a given
phenomenon to both global and local legal spheres.260
In international investment law, constitutional theory has
spurred a ground-breaking debate on the nature of international
investment law and arbitration. It has also brought attention to
general principles of law as an important source of international law
and a way to humanise international (investment) law.
Constitutional approaches certainly have contributed to the mosaic
of existing methods in investigating international law.
This is not to say, however, that constitutional theory constitutes
the best theoretical framework for investigating international law.261
Rather, constitutional approaches present both opportunities and
dangers. They can constitute one of the available methods or
hermeneutic devices to investigate international law.262 In addition,
they can “alter our intellectual landscape in some quite decisive
ways” and nurture healthy academic debates.263
However,
constitutional approaches are neither the sole, nor necessarily the
257
See Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,
in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) (noting the
parallel coexistence of the local and the global level of governance in the
globalization dynamics).
258
See generally Rostam Neuwirth, Glocalisation: Time-Space and HomogeneityHeterogeneity, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25 (Mike Fatherstone et al. eds., 1995); Natalie
Zernon Davies, Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a Global
World, 50 HIST. & THEORY 188 (2011).
259
Susan S. Silbey, Globalization, in CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 245,
246 (2006).
260
Rostam Neuwirth, Governing Glocalisation: “Mind the Change” or “Change the
Mind”?, 12 HOKKAIDO J. NEW GLOB. L. & POL’Y 215 (2011) (describing the
innovations that are leading to the acceleration of change in global and local
governance).
261
But see Casini, supra note 255, at 475.
262
Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL
STUD. 397 (2009).
263
Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL.
995, 1001 (2005) (noting that GAL can “alter our intellectual landscape in some quite
decisive ways”).
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best method for studying international phenomena, including in the
field of international investment relations.
Like any other method, constitutional theory also presents
pitfalls. Constitutional ideas vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
reflecting the preferences of society—for example, regarding the
allocation of power between the different branches of government.
Because investment treaty arbitration is a creature of international
law, it would be problematic to universalize the experience of any
particular jurisdiction on the international level. For instance, some
scholars question whether constitutional ideas can migrate
successfully from a given constitutional experience to the
international plane, contending that constitutional ideas are linked
to the constitutional culture in which they are rooted.264 Critics
contend that sovereignty concerns also matter. Arbitrators should
not impose “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” on their audiences, as
this would go beyond their mandate, transform them into
lawmakers, and undermine their legitimacy.265 In investment treaty
arbitration, reference to the constitutional experience of a country
other than the host state would seem out of place.266 Moreover, such
judicial borrowing can alter the text of the applicable IIA.
This Article suggested possible complementary and/or
alternative approaches to constitutional theory to investigate ISDS;
while the overview given above is certainly not normative, it aims
at opening a dialogue, and illuminating promising paths for future
research. In particular, this Article highlights that international law
requires “epistemological pluralism,” that is, different methods of
enquiry. Far from suggesting a single method as the best way
forward, this Article argues that international law is particularly
264
See, e.g., PEER ZUMBANSEN, TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISONS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS A CRITIQUE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014).
265 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari)) (stating that societal change and advancement of human rights is
imposing morals on others).
266
A given constitutional practice may be relevant not only when the
applicable law is a national law; national law may be a qualitatively different fact
from other facts in the case, and command special attention and relevance. For
instance, some arbitral tribunals have referred to proportionality because
proportionality was embedded in the national law that was applicable to the given
dispute. See JARROD HEPBURN, DOMESTIC LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2017).
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suitable to a plurality of methods, including inter-civilizational
approaches, and can (and has) been studied by adopting different
methods and perspectives.
Therefore, only a kaleidoscopic
juxtaposition of different methods and approaches can help scholars
and practitioners to decipher the complexity of international
investment law. In conclusion, the adoption of a more varied toolkit
for investigating international investment arbitration can only
benefit the field.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite functional analogies, arbitral tribunals are not global
constitutional courts for both structural and functional reasons.
Whether the constitutionalisation of international law in general,
and international investment law in particular, has taken place
remains subject to debate. Yet, the fact that international investment
law still lacks constitutional density—that is, the quintessential
features that characterize constitutional systems—does not mean
that it cannot acquire such features in the future through treaty
making or jurisprudential developments.
For the time being, constitutional theory provides a useful
toolkit for approaching the increasingly complex subject of
international investment law. It can shed some light on certain
idiosyncrasies of international investment law and arbitration and
stimulate fruitful academic debate. However, like any other
method, unavoidably, it also presents pitfalls. The comparative
legal analysis used to detect general principles of law must be
extensive and representative, albeit not necessarily uniform or
universal. Attempts to export the constitutional law peculiarities of
a limited number of liberal states could be perceived as an
imperialist project. While constitutional theory constitutes a useful
approach to studying international law, and can promote crossfertilization, some checks and balances and, in some cases, even the
humanisation of international adjudication, it does not constitute the
sole or necessarily best method for doing so.
Rather, it has been suggested in this Article that international
law requires epistemological pluralism, that is, different methods of
enquiry. An inter-civilizational perspective is particularly suitable
to investor-state arbitration that, by definition, involves parties from
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different regions of the world. An inter-civilizational approach that
is sensitive to different values and concerns of different civilizations
can be better suited to examine ISDS, in which a great variety of
interactions between different regimes and civilizations
systematically occurs. Such perspective can also help propose
meaningful and viable reforms of investor-state arbitration.
Civilizations should dialogue with one another; an intercivilizational approach to international investment law highlights
the plurality of the cultures that compose it, and can only foster just,
peaceful, and prosperous relations among nations. This approach
can also address the particular realities of local communities and
empower the marginalized. In conclusion, arbitral tribunals should
better reflect the rich cultural diversity of the world and take into
account the perspectives of the different cultures and civilizations
involved in a given arbitration. A truly international, intercultural
and inter-civilizational perspective acknowledges the pluralist
foundations of international law.
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